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Abstract 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a highly prevalent psychological disorder that 
affects an estimated 20.6% of adults in the United States. Despite significant research efforts, 
treatment response rates remain unacceptably low. The Establishing Moderators and 
Biosignatures of Antidepressant Response for Clinical Care for Depression (EMBARC) study 
aimed to address this problem through the search for "biosignatures" that include clinical, 
contextual, and biological measures to identify a more personalized approach to identifying 
appropriate treatment recommendations. Through three distinct investigations, this dissertation 
aims to utilize prior research to study “biosignatures" that may be relevant for predicting 
antidepressant treatment response. Results from this dissertation may inform future personalized 
approaches to depression care that may reduce the time to receiving adequate treatment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Three-Paper Project 
Overview 
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is a highly prevalent psychological disorder that 
affects an estimated 20.6% of adults in the United States, with up to 50% being considered 
severe (Hasin, 2018). Globally, it is estimated that MDD contributes to a worldwide disease 
burden of up to 11% (Greden, 2001). For individuals with MDD and their family members, 
symptoms of depression can contribute to significant impairment in daily functioning. 
MDD is characterized by 1) a history of a period of two weeks or longer where an 
individual experiences depressed mood or a loss of interest or pleasure in things they used to 
enjoy, and 2) at least four other symptoms reflective of impaired functioning including: 
difficulties sleeping, changes in appetite, decreased energy or concentration, feeling worthless or 
inappropriate guilt, or recurrent thoughts of death or suicide (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). 
The prevalence rate of MDD has been increasing in recent years. It is expected that 
depression will be the second leading cause of death, after heart disease, by 2020 (Lopez, 1998), 
and it is the leading cause of disability for working age adults in America (Kessler, Chiu, 
Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005) with an economic burden estimated at $83.1 billion 
(Greenberg et al., 2003). The most severe burden of depression is the high suicide rate. Deaths 
attributable to suicide among individuals diagnosed with MDD is as high as 15% (Guze & 
Robins, 1970).  
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Treatment response in depression 
For individuals who do receive treatment, it is anything but a “quick fix”, and partial 
response and treatment resistance is common among interventions for depression (Fava & 
Davidson, 1996). Response to treatment is slow and hard to predict, taking an average of 4-6 
weeks until any changes are noticed (Nierenberg, 2000), and a significant proportion of people 
will develop treatment-resistant depression despite receiving adequate courses of therapy (Fava 
& Davidson, 1996). For individuals with depression, this can become an arduous process of trial 
and error, with each trial taking up to two months before determining whether it is effective or 
not. 
Unfortunately, in addition to the barriers to seeking help and identifying the appropriate 
medication, the response and remission rates for first line antidepressants are quite low. 
Randomized control trials typically define MDD treatment response as a 50% or greater 
reduction in depression symptoms relative to baseline, while the remission of depression 
symptoms has typically been defined using the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Hamilton, 
1960), with most studies using a cutoff of 7-10 or less (Nierenberg, 2001). As many as 45% of 
individuals with depression fail to respond to antidepressant treatment of adequate dose and 
duration (Fava & Davidson, 1996), and full remission of depressive symptoms is much lower. 
Some estimate that as few as 11 percent of individuals with depression reach remission, even 
after 8–12 months (Cipriani et al., 2009).  
The age of personalized medicine: a brief history 
Following the Decade of the Brain (Jones & Mendell, 1999), the National Institutes of 
Health increased funding for personalized medicine research that aims to match individuals with 
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interventions using a number of clinically relevant variables (Hamburg & Collins, 2010; Insel & 
Cuthbert, 2015).  
One of the first major studies of treatment response in depression was the Sequenced 
Treatment Alternatives to Relieve Depression (STAR*D) study (Trivedi, 2006). STAR*D was 
able to provide data that dispelled prior clinical intuition including the belief that switching from 
one SSRI to another SSRI within the same class or switching from an SSRI to a dual-action 
agent (e.g. Venlafaxine) would be unlikely to be successful. Rather, when switching medications 
within the SSRI class or switching to a dual-action agent was demonstrated to be an effective 
treatment strategy (Fava, 2010). Further, it provided evidence that individuals with MDD and 
comorbid anxiety were more likely to suffer increased functional impairment and a longer 
duration of illness (Fava, 2000; Fava, 2004). While the STAR*D was undoubtedly useful for 
demonstrating the feasibility of conducting a large-scale investigation into antidepressant 
treatment response, it had several limitations. It did not include a placebo arm, which prohibited 
the analysis of relative effectiveness, only allowing for information on medication non-response 
and toxicity (Rush, 2007). Further, while it provided demographic information on who is likely 
to respond, remit, or derive no benefits from antidepressant treatment, it did not provide 
information that could allow a patient or a provider to predict what treatment option is likely to 
be most effective. 
Further, while there were numerous scientific advancements resulting from the Decade of 
the brain, investigations in the field turned towards the search for “biomarkers” and less research 
was published on the contextual and psychological variables that are likely to be relevant to 
depression treatment. As argued by Miller (2010), the allure of identifying biological variables 
that are assumed to cause psychological processes, has led biological investigations to receive 
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preferential attention relative to psychological investigations. As a result, measures of 
psychological function that had previously demonstrated preliminary promise have received little 
attention recently including studies of personality (Joyce, Mulder, & Cloniger; 1994), cognitive 
(Reynaert et al., 1995), and social (Peslow et al., 1992) processes. Nonetheless, biomarkers are 
likely to demonstrate utility, in conjunction with other contextual and psychological units of 
analysis, for predicting antidepressant treatment response. More recent investigations have 
demonstrated the possible utility of biomarkers for determining antidepressant treatment 
response including electroencephalographic (EEG) rostral anterior cingulate (rACC) theta 
activity (Pizzagalli, 2011), the event related potential (ERP) P300 (Jaworska, 2013), and the 
loudness dependence of the auditory evoked potential (LDAEP; Hegerl, 1993).  
Thus, out of an awareness of the limitations of the STAR*D study and the need to 
incorporate contextual and psychological units of analysis, the Establishing Moderators and 
Biosignatures of Antidepressant Response for Clinical Care for Depression (EMBARC) study 
was born, and it is the source of data for two of the studies presented in this dissertation. The 
EMBARC study is a multisite study that recruited more than 300 outpatients with recurrent, 
nonpsychotic MDD from 4 sites: Columbia University, New York; Massachusetts General 
Hospital, Boston; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and the University of Texas Southwestern 
Medical Center, Dallas. It is an 8-week, placebo-controlled, randomized controlled trial, of 
sertraline, with a second randomization arm of either bupropion (for sertraline non-responders) 
or sertraline (for placebo non-responders) for individuals who do not respond during the first 8-
weeks. An aim of EMBARC was to study “biosignatures” of treatment response rather than 
“biomarkers”. While “biomarkers” were typically biological variables from a single unit of 
analysis, it was hoped that the study of “biosignatures” would provide for a more personalized 
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approach to identifying appropriate treatment recommendations. “Biosignatures” were defined 
by EMBARC (Trivedi, 2016) to encompass a number of variables from several of units of 
analysis, including performance on behavioral tasks, clinical history, current clinical status, and 
personality pathology, in addition to more recent developments in the study of “biomarkers” 
including genetics, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and electroencephalography 
(EEG). 
Therefore, through three distinct investigations, this dissertation aims to utilize prior 
research to study “biosignatures", encompassing “biomarkers”, psychological, and contextual 
variables that may be relevant for predicting antidepressant treatment response.  
Study 1 
Study 1, included in Chapter 2, summarizes results from an ancillary study that recruited 
participants who had recently completed their participation in the EMBARC study. This study 
aimed to identify psychological variables that might moderate treatment response to either a 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) or a norepinephrine dopamine reuptake inhibitor 
(NDRI). Through the collection of data using self-report instruments, this study assessed 
measures of cognition (Reynaert et al., 1995), personality (Joyce, Mulder, & Cloniger; 1994), 
and social (Peslow et al., 1992) processes that were previously reported to be relevant to 
antidepressant treatment response. This study aimed to identify low cost instruments that have 
the possibility of easy and swift translation into routine care (Clarke & Kuhl, 2014) by reviewing 
prior evidence to identify self-report measures that may be useful for predicting antidepressant 
treatment response.  
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Study 2 
Study 2 (Chapter 3) focuses on identifying variables associated with the placebo 
response, with a focus on the positive valence systems and arousal/regulation systems. Utilizing 
functional magnetic resonance imaging data, (Schweinhardt, Seminowicz, Jaeger, Duncan, & 
Bushnell, 2009) defined several neuroanatomical regions that are believed to be necessary for the 
placebo response, known as the mesolimbic reward system. The mesolimbic reward system is a 
sub-system of the positive valence systems that facilitates reward processing. As the expectation 
of reward is believed to be an essential ingredient in the placebo response (Murray & Stoessl, 
2013), this dissertation discusses results the relevance of physiological, self-report, and 
behavioral data to the placebo response from a paradigm reported to index reward systems. 
Study 3 
Study 3 (chapter 4) assesses the effectiveness of an intervention that is believed to target 
the transdiagnostic phenotype of negative self-referential processing. Negative self-referential 
processing encompasses both rumination and worry (Mennin & Fresco, 2013). Negative self-
referential processing has been described as dysfunctional in depression and, in part, responsible 
for maintaining negative moods (Beck, 1979). Study 3 aimed to target negative self-referential 
processes using the psychotherapy technique of cognitive defusion. Cognitive defusion is an 
empirically supported intervention (Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda et al., 2010), adapted from 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), that trains participants to create psychological 
distance from their thoughts (Kross, 2001; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004) in order to 
facilitate adaptive self-reflection, interrupt negative self-referential cognitions, and reduce 
subjective distress associated with thoughts (Deacon, Fawzy, Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; 
Mori & Tanno, 2015; Yovel, Mor, & Shakarov, 2014). In order to assess the effectiveness of this 
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cognitive intervention on its intended target, physiological and behavioral methods were utilized 
to index and assess for changes in the cognitive and socio-affective processes that have been 
reported to be dysfunctional in depression. 
Taken together, results from this dissertation may inform future personalized approaches 
toward depression care that aims to identify relevant indices that may reduce the time to 
receiving adequate treatment in depression and, possibly, identify easily translatable assessment 
measures that can swiftly be implemented in routine clinical care.  
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Specific Aims 
Study 1 
To investigate the role of positive valence systems, corresponding to reward circuitry, for 
facilitating the placebo response in individuals with MDD.  
 
Study 2 
To assess whether non-biological measures from the self-report unit of analysis believed to 
assess RDoC systems relevant to psychopathology are useful for differentiating antidepressant 




To investigate whether a single-session intervention believed to target the cognitive systems can 
reduce emotional distress associated with a difficult thought, and to explore whether this 
cognitive system intervention is associated with changes in psychophysiological responses that 
index the cognitive systems of attention and response inhibition. 
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Chapter 2: Sociotropy and Autonomy - A cognitive-personality style predicative of 
antidepressant treatment outcomes 
Introduction 
The restoration of socioemotional functioning appears to be an important therapeutic 
mechanism of SSRI treatment (Challis, 2015; Levitan, Hasey and Sloman, 2000). Social rank 
theory has been used to describe the etiology of socioemotional dysfunction in depression 
(Santor, 2003) and the role of serotonergic interventions in socioemotional function restoration 
(Levitan, Hasey and Sloman, 2000).  
Social Rank Theory 
Social rank theory is an evolutionary model of typical sociobiological development of 
animals and humans that is used to understand the mechanisms by which dysfunctional processes 
contribute to the etiology of psychopathology (Price & Sloman, 1987). This theory states that 
animals living in a group have the advantage of gaining resources and increasing reproductive 
success in the evolutionary process. This theory assumes that humans and animals are motivated 
to achieve dominant status because it leads to more chances of gaining access to food and to 
potential mates. Living together exposes them to constant conflict in the competition for 
dominance, which is key to successful reproduction (Gilbert, 2006). Animals with dominant 
statuses are more successful in gaining access to food and mates, compared with those in 
subordinate positions. In this context, displays of submission signal to dominant individuals that 
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subordinate group members are not a threat to their rank within the social hierarchy. This helps 
to achieve social cohesion. 
Social Rank Theory as a Model of Depression 
According to the sociobiological perspective of social rank theory, anxiety and 
depression are natural experiences that are common to all mammalian species, and it is the 
pathological exaggeration of anxiety and depression that contributes to psychological disorders. 
The involuntary subordinate strategy is a model that was developed by Price (1972) who noted 
depressed-like states occur in animals and humans who have been defeated and lose rank, and in 
subordinates who are regularly harassed or threatened by more dominant animals and cannot 
escape. The function of these depressed states in a social rank context are two-fold: (1) to down-
regulate an animal/ person’s goal pursuits and behavior and avoid directly challenging dominants 
(or seeking resources, e.g. sexual contacts) that could stir their attack, and keep a low and 
vigilant profile; and (2) to impact on the mind of the dominant such that the dominant either 
accepts a submission and/or sees them as inhibited/timid/ compliant and ‘out of action’ and, 
therefore, as no threat to him/her (Price, 1972). According to social rank theory, the involuntary 
subordinate strategy is an evolutionarily adaptive strategy, and it is the pathological exaggeration 
of this strategy that is associated with psychopathology (Gilbert, 1992, 2000). This led to the 
theory by Price and Sloman (1987) that animals who experience involuntary submission after 
social defeat would show biochemical and behaviors resembling depressive symptoms in 
humans including lower serotonergic transmission, social motivation, and affiliative behavior 
and higher levels of stress and sleeping problems. A more specific theory of involuntary 
subordination called the Involuntary Defeat Strategy (IDS) was proposed by Sloman (2000) to be 
specifically relevant to depression. The Involuntary Defeat Strategy (IDS) is a genetically 
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preprogrammed strategy triggered by the individual’s recognition that defeat in social 
competition is inevitable.  In sum, social rank theory locates affiliative and ranking structures at 
the core of many psychological disorders (Price & Sloman, 1987). 
The relationship of serotonin to social rank regulation 
Social rank theory has been used to model the depression-like effects of social defeat in 
monkeys (Shively et al. 1997) and rodents (Rygula et al. 2005), and they have even been 
detected in “primitive” animals (Yeh, 1996). Consequently, the social defeat model is now 
regularly used to model depression in animals (Rygula et al. 2005). There is growing evidence 
that social defeats and social harassment set in motion a set of long-lasting physiological and 
behavioral responses that appear depression-like (Gilbert, 2000; Levitan et al. 2000) via a variety 
of neurotransmitters [e.g. serotonin (Raleigh, 1991) and dopamine (Morgan, 2002) and social 
neuroendocrines [e.g. testosterone (Terburg, 2013) and cortisol (Mehta & Josephs, 2010)]. 
Raleigh et al. (1984) were among the first to record elevated blood serotonin concentration in 
primates who occupied the dominant male social position. Further, they found that elevated 
blood serotonin concentration is a state-dependent consequence of active occupation of the 
dominant male social position, as spontaneous and induced gains or losses in social status were 
accompanied by corresponding increases or decreases in whole-blood serotonin concentrations. 
A follow up experimental study by Raleigh et al. (1991) replicated the prior findings identifying 
a dominant male with twice the blood serotonin levels of the other males, and demonstrated that 
enhancement or suppression of serotonin signaling can respectively induce dominance or 
subordination in treated velvet monkeys (Raleigh, 1991). The relation between social rank and 
serotonergic function appear to be bidirectional such that manipulations of social rank or 
serotonergic transmission will have a reciprocal reaction on the other. Pharmacological 
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interventions that increase brain serotonin can increase the frequency of positive socially 
affiliative behavior and improve social rank, and the opposite is true when serotonin is 
pharmacologically reduced (Raleigh, 1986; Raleigh, 1991). Conversely, changes in social rank 
may affect serotonin functioning: higher social ranking is associated with increased serotonergic 
transmission, and when social ranking is reduced, serotonergic transmission is correspondingly 
reduced (Raliegh, 1984). Yeh and colleagues (1996) reported that in subordinate crayfish, 
serotonin suppresses firing in the neurons controlling tail flick (a threat response) but it increases 
probability of firing in dominants. More recently, a trait aspect of the serotonin-dominance 
hypothesis was identified: higher-ranked monkeys have been shown to demonstrate more gray 
matter in the dorsal raphe nucleus, which contains serotoninergic neurons (Noonan, 2014). In 
sum, serotonin appears to exhibit both state (Raleigh, 1991; Raleigh, 1984) and trait (Noonan, 
2014) relationships to social dominance.  
Manipulation of serotonin levels in humans has provided evidence for the role of 
serotonin in human social behaviors such as social dominance and social affiliation. In line with 
the preclinical findings in animal models, Tse and Bond (2002a) found that two weeks of 
citalopram treatment enhanced expression of dominant social behaviors on a number of different 
measures (e.g. eye gaze behavior and communication) and were suggested to be important for 
promotion of social relationships. Further supporting the relationship between serotonin levels 
and socially dominant behaviors, Moskowitz et al. (2001) found that enhancing serotonin levels 
through a precursor of serotonin biosynthesis (1 g tryptophan) administered over 12 days 
enhanced dominance-related behaviors in friendship as reported by participants' friends. More 
recently, Tse and colleagues (2014) provided evidence to demonstrate that a single dose of an 
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SSRI (escitalopram) enhanced motivation for social dominance through the initiation of a 
combination of aggressive and affiliative behaviors 
In addition to serotonin’s role in facilitating socially dominant behavior, evidence 
suggests that serotonin is important for socially affiliative behavior as well (Insel, 1998). 
Socially dominant individuals acquire tactics (e.g. coercive or pro-social behavior) to exert 
control over resources in the belief that on one hand, these tactics promote their ability to acquire 
resources and on the other hand, they minimize the personal cost of conflict (Hawley, 1999). 
Therefore, an important developmental goal in humans is to learn how to read social signals and 
identify socially competent ways to achieve dominance flexibly, using prosocial strategies 
(Hawley, 2002). Serotonin plays a crucial role in social affiliation through the promotion of 
competent social behavior and through de-escalation by controlling impulses that regulate 
aggression (Higley, 1996; Soubrie, 1986). In support of the role of serotonin for facilitating 
socially affiliative behaviors, Knutson et al. 1998 reported that 1 week treatment with a selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (paroxetine) relative to a placebo reduced focal indices of hostility 
through a more general decrease in negative affect, and increased a behavioral index of social 
affiliation, after both 1 week and 4 weeks of treatment in healthy volunteers. Data from Wood 
and colleagues (2006) provided additional evidence that serotonin is important for facilitating 
socially affiliative behaviors by experimentally attenuating serotonin levels in humans. In 
healthy volunteers, experimentally induced tryptophan depletion that reduced the availability of 
serotonin for biosynthesis produced significant reductions in the level of cooperation from 
behavior associated with more long-term gain toward in favor of short-term profit shown by 
participants when playing the game (Wood, Rilling, Sanfey, Bhagwagar, & Rogers, 2006). This 
suggested that serotonin may modulate reward information to facilitate socially cooperative 
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behavior. Several other studies have found that nonhuman primates with high CSF 5-HIAA 
concentrations are more likely to engage and spend time in positive social interactions (Higley, 
1994; Mehlman, 1995; Raleigh, 1983; Raliegh 1994). Taken together, this evidence suggests that 
increased social competence could be a potential therapeutic mechanism for serotonergic 
antidepressants. 
Sociotropy-Autonomy & Social Rank 
Given the role of serotonin in social dominance and social affiliation behaviors, and the 
changes that occur in social dominance and social affiliation behaviors in response to 
pharmacological manipulations of serotonin, the present study sought to examine the relationship 
of a measure of social dominance and social affiliation to the antidepressant treatment response. 
A number of diverse theories of psychopathology have converged to suggest that sociotropy 
(relatedness) and autonomy (self-definition) are two fundamental psychological dimensions that 
provide a theoretical understanding for variations in normal personality organization and the 
mechanisms by which dysfunction within these dimensions leads to the development of 
psychopathology (see Luyten & Blatt, 2011 for a comprehensive review). The cognitive-
personality domains of sociotropy and autonomy introduced by Beck (1983) have been described 
as two domains of personality that are highly relevant for understanding vulnerability to 
depression in the context of social rank theory (Santor, 2003). Autonomy refers to an 
achievement-oriented personality style associated with attempts to maximize control over the 
environment. Sociotropy involves investment in and attachment to others. Beck (1983) proposed 
that a balance between autonomy and sociotropy characterizes adaptive personality development. 
Highly sociotropic individuals are prone to interpersonal dependency characterized by a high 
need for close relationships and tend to be very concerned with how they are viewed by others 
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whom they often work hard to please. Individuals high in autonomy are characterized by a heavy 
emphasis on personal achievements, independence, and control. It was hypothesized that highly 
sociotropic individuals are prone to depression as a result of interpersonal loss, and highly 
autotropic individuals are prone to depression as a result of perceived life failures (Joyce, 1994).   
Sociotropic and autonomic individuals have different goal sets that can be understood in 
relationship to the social rank theory (Santor, 2003). Autonomic individuals are motivated to 
preserve and enhance a dominant status, whereas submissive and dependent sociotropic 
individuals are motivated to preserve and enhance interpersonal relations. Different behavioral 
tactics are used to pursue these goals; sociotropic individuals are more likely to be submissive, 
appease others, and downplay disagreements, whereas autonomic individuals are more likely to 
retaliate against threats to status and make frequent social comparisons. In a series of 
experiments, Santor and Zuroff (1997, 1998) found that autonomous and sociotropic women did 
indeed employ these behavioral tactics when outperforming, or being outperformed by, a friend 
on a task. Santor & Zuroaff (1997) suggested instead, that autonomous and sociotropic 
individuals are characterized by both insecure attachment and insecure social rank, but that they 
employ different strategies in response to their dual insecurities. Taken together, autonomous 
individuals tend to be motivated by goals to pursue social dominance, whereas sociotropic 
individuals tend to be motivated by goals to pursue social affiliation, which can manifest as 
submissiveness or dependency in response to insecure attachment.  
Peselow and colleagues (1992) were among the first to assess the ability of the 
Sociotropy-Autonomy scale to predict antidepressant treatment response in individuals with 
depression. They found that the combination between high autonomy and low sociotropy scores 
predicted a positive response to antidepressant treatment. Moreover, individuals with high 
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autonomy and low sociotropy were more likely to respond to an antidepressant than a placebo, 
whereas no difference was found between active treatment and placebo among the high 
sociotropy and low autonomy group. Another study (Scott, 1996) upheld these findings and 
found that higher autonomy scores predicted lower symptom severity after 3 months of 
antidepressant treatment and recovery from depression at 6 months. They did not find an 
association between sociotropy treatment outcomes. Mazure and colleagues (2000) extended this 
work by examining the moderating effects of adverse life events and found that a congruency 
between the frequency of adverse life events (interpersonal vs. achievement) and cognitive-
personality style (sociotropy vs. autonomy, respectively) predicted better treatment outcomes, 
accounting for 65% of the variance. Marhsall, Zuroff, McBride, & Bagby (2008) found 
differential patterns of treatment response depending on the individuals cognitive-personality 
style such that individuals high in self-criticism were more likely to benefit from 
pharmacotherapy, individuals high in dependency were less likely to benefit from CBT, 
individuals high in self-criticism were less likely to benefit from pharmacotherapy and IPT. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that the cognitive-personality styles of sociotropy and 
autonomy may be useful indicators of antidepressant treatment response. Taken together, 
evidence suggests that increased social dominance-submissiveness and socially affiliative 
behaviors could also be a potential therapeutic mechanism for serotonergic antidepressants. 
Study Aims 
Despite the compelling evidence provided by early studies, little research has been 
conducted in recent years to assess the utility of the cognitive-personality styles of sociotropy 
and autonomy in predicting antidepressant treatment response. This study aimed to extend prior 
work by examining the relationship of sociotropy and autonomy to antidepressant treatment 
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outcomes in people with major depression. Further, we aimed to assess the accuracy by which 
these cognitive-personality styles can distinguish between treatment responders and non-
responders.  
Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that 1) indices of sociotropy and autonomy would be useful for 
differentiating treatment responders from non-responders; 2) individuals with high autonomy and 
low sociotropy would be more likely to respond to treatment than individuals with low autonomy 
and high sociotropy; and,  3) higher levels of autonomy and lower levels of sociotropy would be 
linearly related to changes in depression scores from pre to post treatment. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants in this study were recruited from the Establishing Moderators and 
Biosignatures of Antidepressant Response for Clinical Care (EMBARC) study. EMBARC was a 
multi-site collaboration among the University of Michigan, the University of Texas 
Southwestern, Columbia University, and Massachusetts General Hospital supported by the 
National Institute of Health to examine biomarkers of treatment response in depression. 
Participants in the EMBARC study were first randomized to receive either sertraline or a placebo 
during the first 8 weeks of the study. During the second 8 weeks, sertraline non-responders (as 
determined by a Hamilton Depression Rating Scale [HDRS] reduction of 50% or less) were then 
randomized to receive bupropion or a placebo, and placebo non-responders were then 
randomized to receive either sertraline or a second placebo.  
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This ancillary study was approved by the EMBARC team in order to collect and assess 
cognitive styles and personality traits that may differentiate treatment responders from non-
responders. IRB approval was obtained from the boards at the University of Michigan, 
University of Texas - Southwestern, Columbia University, and Massachusetts General Hospital 
sites. Participants who completed the study within the past year and signed a consent to be 
contacted for future research studies were contacted by phone or in person at the end of their 
final (Week 16) follow up visit in the larger EMBARC project and asked about their interest in 
participating in this project. Participants who completed participation in the larger EMBARC 
study within the past six months and were in the sample of individuals with depression (healthy 
controls were excluded) were eligible to enroll in this study.  
Thirty-seven individuals were contacted for participation in this follow-up study. Of the 
37 participants contacted, 30 have completed this ancillary study, 2 declined to participate, and 5 
were unreachable. Of the 30 who completed the ancillary study, 4 were excluded from these 
analyses as they were randomized to receive a placebo, and 2 were abnormal terminations that 
did not complete the antidepressant trial. Data collection was approved and began at the 
University of Michigan approximately one year prior to approval at the other sites. Seventeen of 
the participants originated from the University of Michigan site; 3 are from UT Southwestern; 
and 4 are from Massachusetts General Hospital.  
  23 
Table 1: Descriptives for the Sociotropy-Autonomy Study 
 Responder Non-responder   
 M SD M SD t p 
Age (18-65) 41.56 16.11 36.27 14.12 0.84 .41 
HDRS Reduction 72% 15% 4% 34% 5.61 <.01* 
HDRS Baseline 17.67 5.57 16.73 5.19 0.42 .68 
HDRS Change 12.78 5.37 1.40 4.56 5.54 <.01* 
Sociotropy 77.00 7.94 89.47 15.36 -2.25   .04* 
Autonomy 61.00 8.44 63.73 9.66 -0.70 .49 
 N % N % χ2 p 
Sex       
  Male 5 55.6 10 66.7 .30 .59 
  Female 4 44.4 5 33.3   
Race       
  Caucasian 7 77.8 14 93.3 1.24 .26 
  Non-Caucasian 2 22.2 1 6.7   
 
Procedure 
Participants who indicated they were willing to participate were given a questionnaire 
packet with mailing materials to take home. The following questionnaires were included in the 
questionnaire packet: Behavioral Activation System and Behavioral Inhibition System Scale; 
International Physical Activity Questionnaire; Mental Health Locus of Control Scale; Mood and 
Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale; Big Five Inventory; Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory; Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; Ruminative Responses 
Scale; and the Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptoms – Self-Report (QIDS-SR).  This 
manuscript focuses on the results from the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale.  Compensation for 
participation was $10. 
Data Analysis 
Participants who received sertraline either during the first phase of the study or during the 
second phase of the study (after a placebo non-response) were included in the present analyses, 
and change scores were calculated relevant to the first and last week they received sertraline 
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treatment. No differences were detected between phase 1 and phase 2 participants among any of 
the variables (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Comparison of Phase 1 and Phase 2 participants 
 Phase 1 Pts. (n=17) 
Mean (standard dev.) 
Phase 2 Pts. (n=7)  
Mean (standard dev.)  
t p-value 
HDRS Percent Change 19% (4%) 54% (33%) -1.884 .073 
HDRS Baseline Score 17.35 (5.17) 16.33 (5.57) .466 .645 
HDRS Change Score 4.00 (6.87) 9.71 (7.46) -1.810 .084 
Sociotropy 86.29 (14.68) 83.78 (13.44) .427 .673 
Autonomy 63.76 (9.34) 61.89 (8.45) .503 .620 
 
Prior to conducting the classification analyses, we assessed for outliers and ensured the 
statistical assumption of normality was met. No data points were deemed outliers. Participants 
were deemed responders if they exhibited a 50% or greater reduction in depression scores, as 
measured by the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale over 2 months of antidepressant treatment. 
The first analysis conducted aimed to replicate prior work by assessing the role of 
autonomy in distinguishing between treatment responders and non-responders utilizing 
discriminant function analysis (Peselow, 1992; Scott, 1996). Secondly, we assessed the 
discriminating ability of the sociotropy scale. Finally, we examined the accuracy of separating 
treatment responders from non-responders utilizing both the sociotropy and autonomy scales. 
To examine whether a linear relationship exists between the sociotropy and autonomy 
scale and changes in depression scores on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, which was the 
scale used to determine whether participants are labeled treatment responders or non-responders, 
we conducted a follow-up multiple linear regression analysis to estimate the amount of variance 
in depression change scores were accounted for by sociotropy, autonomy, and their interaction. 
Baseline depression severity was controlled for in all three models.
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Results 
Discriminant Function Analysis – Autonomy 
The statistical assumption of Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices was satisfied as 
indicated by a non-significant Box’s M of 0.181 (F(1,1185)=0.172, p=0.678). 
The overall estimated function was not significant (Wilk’s Lambda=0.978, χ-
square(1)=0.476, p=0.490). The estimated function was only able to explain 2.19% of the 
variance in treatment response, with a canonical correlation of 0.148. 
Discriminant Function Analysis – Sociotropy 
The statistical assumption of Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices was satisfied as 
indicated by a non-significant Box’s M of 3.742 (F(1,1185)=3.571, p=0.059). 
The overall estimated function was significant (Wilk’s Lambda=0.813, χ-
square(1)=4.446, p=0.035), with a canonical correlation of 0.432.  The estimated function 
explained 18.66% of the variance in treatment response. Classification analyses utilizing the 
estimated function correctly classified 7/9 responders and 12/15 non-responders with 77.8% 
sensitivity and 80% specificity. Overall, Sociotropy correctly classified 79.2% of originally 
grouped cases. 
Discriminant Function Analysis – Sociotropy & Autonomy 
The statistical assumption of Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices was satisfied as 
indicated by a non-significant Box’s M of 4.178 (F(1,9605)=1.240, p=0.293). 
The overall estimated function was not significant (Wilk’s Lambda=0.767, χ-
square(2)=5.560, p=0.062). The estimated function explained 23.23% of the variance in 
  26 
treatment response, with a canonical correlation of 0.482. Classification analyses utilizing the 
estimated function correctly classified 8/9 responders and 12/15 non-responders with 88.9% 
sensitivity and 80% specificity. Overall, the Sociotropy and Autonomy subscales together 
correctly classified 83.3% of originally grouped cases. 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Sociotropy was a significant predictor of changes in depression severity resulting from 
treatment (Table 3). Lower sociotropy scores were associated with an increased degree of 
treatment response. Consistent with the discriminant function analysis that used sociotropy as an 
independent variable and explained 18.6% of the variance in treatment response, sociotropy 
explained 17.3% of the variance in treatment response, and the overall model explained 30.9% of 
the variance in treatment response. Autonomy did not significantly predict changes in depression 
severity resulting from treatment (Table 4). When sociotropy and autonomy were entered into 
the model along with the interaction variable, none of the variables were significant (Table 5). 
Table 3: Sociotropy - multiple linear regression analysis 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 22.123 2.594 .122 .110 
Sociotropy -0.241 4.389 .048 .173 
Baseline depression severity 0.233 .552 .466 .026 
 
Table 4: Autonomy - multiple linear regression analysis 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 6.633 .429 .520 .020 
Autonomy -0.200 1.710 .205 .075 
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Table 5: Sociotropy & Autonomy - multiple linear regression analysis 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 14.894 .069 .796 .004 
Baseline depression severity 0.220 .452 .509 .023 
Autonomy 0.166 .029 .866 .002 
Sociotropy -0.001 .000 .999 .000 
Interaction -0.004 .167 .688 .009 
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Discussion 
Serotonin plays an important role in facilitating social dominance and social affiliation 
behaviors (Insel, 1998; Levitan, Hasey and Sloman, 2000), alongside dopamine (Morgan, 2002) 
and the social neuroendocrines [e.g. testosterone (Terburg, 2013) and cortisol (Mehta & Josephs, 
2010)]. Deficits in serotenergic activity have been reported among individuals who occupy 
involuntarily subordinate social positions (Noonan, 2014; Levitan et al. 2000; Raleigh, 1984; 
Raleigh, 1991; Yeh, 1996), and may correspond to a reduction in socially affiliative behavior 
(Higley, 1994; Mehlman, 1995; Raleigh, 1983; Raliegh 1994; Insel, 1998; Woods et al., 2006). 
The restoration of socioemotional functioning appears to be an important antidepressant 
mechanism of SSRI treatment (Challis, 2015; Levitan, Hasey and Sloman, 2000). Successful 
serotonin treatment in depression may in part be facilitated via improvements in socially 
affiliative behavior (Knutson, 1998) and perceptions of increased social rank (Raleigh, 1986; 
Raleigh, 1991; Tse and Bond, 2002; Moscowitz, 2001; Tse and Bond, 2014). 
Dysfunction within the systems responsible for socially dominant and affiliative 
behaviors is hypothesized to contribute to the depressed state (Raleigh, 1991). Sertotenergic 
enhancing interventions have been reported to produce increases in social rank and socially 
affiliative behaviors (Tse, 2002) that may correspond to improved social functioning. The 
present study sought to examine the relationship of a self-report measure of social dominance 
and social affiliation (Santor, 2003) is useful for distinguishing antidepressant treatment 
responsers from non-responders.  
Sociotropy and autonomy, which were proposed by (Beck, 1983), are two fundamental 
psychological dimensions that provide a theoretical understanding for variations in normal 
personality organization (see Luyten & Blatt, 2011 for a comprehensive review). Dysfunction 
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within these dimensions is thought to be useful as a model for the development of 
psychopathology. Dysfunctionally high levels of sociotropy are associated with excessive 
submissiveness in a maladaptive attempt to increase affiliation, while dysfunctionally high levels 
of autonomy are associated with excessive dominance behaviors (Santor, 2003). It was 
hypothesized that highly sociotropic individuals are prone to depression as a result of 
interpersonal loss, and highly autotropic individuals are prone to depression as a result of 
perceived life failures (Joyce, 1994). Results from the current study add to a body of evidence 
suggesting that the Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale is useful for differentiating antidepressant 
treatment responders and non-responders (Mazure, 2000; Peselow, 1992; Scott, 1996; McBride, 
2008). The current work extends prior investigations by utilizing discriminant function analysis 
to examine the ability of the sociotropy-autonomy scale to classify participants as treatment 
responders or non-responders. Notably, the sociotropy-autonomy scale was able to correctly 
classify 83.3% of participants into responder and non-responder categories. The sociotropy 
subscale alone was able to correctly classify 79.2% of the participants, with the autonomy scale 
only improving classification by 4.1%. 
Social rank theory is useful for understanding the context in which sociotropy and 
autonomy convey vulnerability to depression (Santor, 2003). Social rank theory has been used to 
describe the etiology of socioemotional dysfunction in depression (Santor, 2003) and the role of 
serotonergic interventions in socioemotional function restoration (Levitan, Hasey and Sloman, 
2000). Social rank theory is an evolutionary model of typical sociobiological development of 
animals and humans to respond appropriately to dominance hierarchies (Gilbert, 2006) that is 
used to understand the mechanisms by which dysfunctional processes contribute to the etiology 
of psychopathology via socially affiliative and social ranking structures (Price & Sloman, 1987). 
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Socially dominant individuals acquire tactics (e.g. coercive or pro-social behavior) to exert 
control over resources in the belief that on one hand, these tactics promote their ability to acquire 
resources and on the other hand, they minimize the personal cost of conflict (Hawley, 1999; 
Hawley, 2002; Higley, 1996; Soubrie, 1986). According to social rank theory, the involuntary 
subordinate strategy (Price, 1972; Price & Sloman, 1987; Gilbert, 1992, 2000) and, more recent, 
involuntary defeat strategy (Sloman, 2000) is an evolutionarily adaptive strategy (Shively et al. 
1997; Rygula et al. 2005; Yeh, 1996) whereby depressed states in a social rank context function 
to  (1) to down-regulate an animal/ person’s goal pursuits and behaviour and avoid directly 
challenging dominants (or seeking resources, e.g. sexual contacts) that could stir their attack, and 
keep a low and vigilant profile; and (2) to impact on the mind of the dominant such that the 
dominant either accepts a submission and/or sees them as inhibited/timid/ compliant and ‘out of 
action’ and, therefore, as no threat to him/her (Price, 1972). It has been argued that it is the 
pathological exaggeration of this strategy that is associated with psychopathology.   
In response to involuntary defeat, sociotropic and autonomic individuals may respond in 
different patterns depending on their cognitive-personality orientation. Autonomic individuals 
are motivated to preserve and enhance a dominant status, whereas submissive and dependent 
sociotropic individuals are motivated to preserve and enhance interpersonal relations. Santor & 
Zuroaff (1997) suggested instead, that autonomous and sociotropic individuals are characterized 
by both insecure attachment and insecure social rank, but that they employ different strategies in 
response to their dual insecurities. Sociotropic individuals are more likely to be submissive, 
appease others, and downplay disagreements, whereas autonomic individuals are more likely to 
retaliate against threats to status and make frequent social comparisons.  
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The results from the present study are consistent with the pattern of results demonstrated 
by Peselow (1992) who found that the group of high autonomy and low sociotropy experienced 
greater reductions in depression severity relative to the other combinations of autonomy and 
sociotropy. While another study (Scott, 1996) found that autonomy was a better predictor of 
treatment outcomes than sociotropy, this study is consistent with general pattern of lower 
sociotropy relative to autonomy being indicative of a positive treatment response. However, in 
contrast to Scott and colleagues (1996), data from this study suggest that the sociotropy subscale 
was more useful than the autonomy subscale at differentiating treatment responders from non-
responders. Although they did not find direct associations of autonomy or sociotropy to 
treatment outcomes, the effect sizes found in this study are consistent with work by Mazure 
(2000) that found the frequency of adverse life experiences and sociotropy-autonomy scores 
were able to account for 65% of the variance in treatment outcomes. 
It is possible that measures of the cognitive-personality styles of sociotropy-autonomy are 
useful indices of antidepressant treatment response due to their relationship to socially dominant 
and affiliative behaviors (Santor, 2003), which have been reported to be facilitated in part via the 
neurotransmitter serotonin (Tse, 2002). It is possible that for individuals high in autonomous 
traits, to whom social dominance is an important motivator, decreases in social ranking that have 
been reported to predict the onset of major depressive episodes (Joyce, 2004) may be reversed 
via pharmacotherapy that acts on the serotonin system. Whereas for individuals high in 
sociotropic traits, whose depressive episodes tend to correspond to interpersonal losses rather 
than losses in social rank (Joyce, 2004), may not necessarily benefit from the social rank boost 
that serotonin offers. 
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Limitations 
Limitations to the current study that should be noted include the small sample size and 
the lack of assessment of the moderating effects of adverse life events reported in prior 
investigations. Further, this study assessed sociotropy and autonomy scores after treatment had 
concluded rather than prior to, which may have biased or findings as some personality trait 
assessment results can vary with degrees of depression (Hirschfeld et al., 1983),  
However, this is unlikely as prior investigations have reported that sociotropy and 
autonomy subscales remain stable from before to after antidepressant treatment (Moore & 
Blackburn, 1996). Despite these limitations, this small sample demonstrated robust classification 
effects, with findings that were in a direction consistent with prior investigations. 
Conclusions 
In sum, this study adds to a prior body of evidence (Mazure, 2000; Peselow, 1992; Scott, 
1996; McBride, 2008) that indicates the utility of the well-established cognitive-personality 
dimensions of sociotropy and autonomy (Luyten & Blatt, 2011) for differentiating antidepressant 
treatment responders and non—responders. Due to the relatively low amount of resources 
necessary for its inclusion, and the ease of translation into routine clinical care, these data 
suggest that the sociotropy-autonomy scale warrant further contemporary investigation. Future 
investigations may benefit from an exploration of the congruence of the precipitating stressors to 
cognitive-personality style of individuals undergoing antidepressant treatment. If the proposed 
relationship of sociotropy-autonomy to antidepressant treatment response in the context of social 
rank theory holds, it may provide useful directions for future investigations into interventions 
that specifically target the unique patterns of dysfunction that are present in highly sociotropic 
non-responders. 
  33 
References 
Bieling, P. J., & Alden, L. E. (2001). Sociotropy, autonomy, and the interpersonal model of 
depression: An integration. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25(2), 167–184. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026491108540 
Bieling, P. J., Beck, A. T., & Brown, G. K. (2000). The Sociotropy-Autonomy Scale: Structure 
and implications. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(6), 763–780. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005599714224 
Dodd, S., & Berk, M. (2004). Predictors of antidepressant response: A selective review. 
International Journal of Psychiatry in Clinical Practice. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13651500410005423 
Fresco, D. M., Sampson, W. S., Craighead, L. W., & Koons, A. N. (2001). The relationship of 
sociotropy and autonomy to symptoms of depression and anxiety. Journal of Cognitive 
Psychotherapy: An International Quarterly. 
Fresco, D. M. (2000). Cognitive styles as moderators of the relationship of life stress to 
depression and anxiety. Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and 
Engineering. 
Mazure, C. M., Bruce, M. L., Maciejewski, P. K., & Jacobs, S. C. (2000). Adverse life events 
and cognitive-personality characteristics in the prediction of major depression and 
antidepressant response. The American Journal of Psychiatry. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.157.6.896 
  34 
Moore, R. G., & Blackburn, I. M. (1996). The stability of sociotropy and autonomy in depressed 
patients undergoing treatment. Cognitive Therapy and Research. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02229244 
Moore, R. G., & Blackburn, I. M. (1994). The relationship of sociotropy and autonomy to 
symptoms, cognition and personality in depressed patients. Journal of Affective Disorders. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-0327(94)90087-6 
Peselow, E. D., Robins, C. J., Sanfilipo, M. P., Block, P., & Fieve, R. R. (1992). Sociotropy and 
Autonomy: Relationship to Antidepressant Drug Treatment Response and Endogenous-
Nonendogenous Dichotomy. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.101.3.479 
Robins, C. J., & Luten, a G. (1991). Sociotropy and autonomy: differential patterns of clinical 
presentation in unipolar depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.100.1.74 
Robins, C. J. (1997). Sociotropy, autonomy, and patterns of symptoms in patients with major 
depression: A comparison of dimensional and categorical approaches. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021874415967 
Scott, J., Harrington, J., House, R., & Ferrier, I. N. (1996). A preliminary study of the 
relationship among personality, cognitive vulnerability, symptom profile, and outcome in 
major depressive disorder. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-199608000-00008 
  35 
Chapter 3: Placebo response in major depression - the moderating effects of anhedonia 
Introduction 
Major Depression places a significant burden on both individuals and families and 
contributes to a worldwide disease burden of up to 11 percent (Greden, 2001). Despite 
substantial effort, a method for identifying the appropriate treatments for individuals suffering 
from depression has remained elusive. Less than 10 percent of individuals with depression 
receive adequate treatment (Hirschfeld et al., 1997). For individuals with depression who do 
receive treatment, as few as 11–30% reach remission, even after 8–12 months (Cipriani et al., 
2009). Among those who are lucky enough to demonstrate benefits from treatment, medication 
side effects can be an obstacle to obtaining tolerable management of depression symptoms 
(Carvalho, Sharma, Brunoni, Vieta, & Fava, 2016). 
One factor reducing effectiveness of treatment is the inability to personalize treatment 
(Insel & Cuthbert, 2015). Clinicians attempt to identify an appropriate treatment strategy via a 
prolonged period of trial and error, delaying clinical improvement and prolonging suffering. As 
such, studies that aim to reduce the time to receive adequate treatment are urgently needed. 
There is a substantial literature investigating possible predictors and moderators of “active” 
antidepressant (Simon & Perlis, 2010) and placebo (Walsh, Seidman, Sysko, & Gould, 2002) 
treatment response.  
The placebo has been defined as an inert agent or procedures that soothe the patient 
(Price, Finniss, & Benedetti, 2008). However, recent research has called this into question as 
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placebo interventions have been reported to exhibit biological changes that mimic active 
interventions (Finniss, Kaptchuk, Miller, & Benedetti, 2010; Petrovic et al., 2005). Up to 30% of 
people who are given a placebo antidepressant will show a clinically significant treatment 
response, and such a response rate exceeds what would otherwise be expected over time without 
any intervention (Charlesworth et al., 2017; Walsh et al., 2002) indicating that the placebo is 
anything but “inert”. Due to the lack of evidence suggesting substantially greater response rates 
among those receiving antidepressant treatment relative to those receiving a placebo, the efficacy 
of first-line antidepressants has been called into question (Kirsch, 2014). A controversial 
conclusion from a comprehensive meta-analysis suggested that up to 75% gains from 
antidepressants are actually driven by the placebo effect (Kirsch & Sapirstein, 1998). More 
recently, a meta-analysis (Rief et al., 2009) came to a similar conclusion, reporting that placebo-
induced effects account for 68% of antidepressant efficacy. One study even went as far as to 
conclude that placebo treatment is more effective than antidepressant treatment (Howick et al., 
2013). Taken together and exclaimed by Wampold, Minami, Tierney, Baskin, & Bhati (2005), 
“the placebo is powerful.” 
Investigations focused on identifying the processes associated with positive placebo 
responses have the potential to enhance pharmacological interventions, even if the effects of 
active therapy are predominantly mediated by a placebo response. Further, if researchers are able 
to identify who may benefit as much from a placebo as they might otherwise benefit from a first-
line antidepressant intervention, placebos provide the potential for the avoidance of chemically-
induced side-effects and possibly improved treatment tolerance. Recent data has suggested that 
placebo interventions without deception are possible (Petkovic et al., 2015), removing the ethical 
barrier of informed treatment consent. 
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An essential ingredient in the placebo response is the expectation of reward (Murray & 
Stoessl, 2013). Schweinhardt, Seminowicz, Jaeger, Duncan, & Bushnell (2009) proposed that the 
placebo response is facilitated via reward processing in a neural network defined as the 
mesolimbic reward system, which incorporates the ventral striatum, insula, and prefrontal cortex. 
Within the mesolimbic reward system, the nucleus accumbens (NAC) initiates the placebo 
response via “reward expectancy” (Scott et al., 2007), and frontal cortical regions help to 
modulate “reward responsiveness” (Faria, Fredrikson, & Furmark, 2008). Up to 43% of the 
variance in symptom improvement at the end of an antidepressant trial was attributable to 
placebo-induced endogenous opioid release in the nucleus accumbens, subgenual anterior 
cingulate cortex, midline thalamus, and amygdala (Peciña et al., 2015). Further emphasizing the 
role of expectation-reward circuitry in the placebo response, increased metabolic activity in the 
ventral striatum after one week of treatment (i.e. prior to symptomatic benefit) distinguished 
placebo responders from non-responders (Benedetti, Mayberg, Wager, Stohler, & Zubieta, 
2005). Taken together, the expectation of reward in an essential component of the placebo 
response, which is facilitated by the mesolimbic reward system. As such, indices of mesolimbic 
reward system processing capacity may be useful for differentiating placebo responders from 
non-responders, with individuals who demonstrate an attenuated capacity for reward system 
processing being less likely to benefit from a placebo. 
Behaviorally, the probabilistic reward task was developed and validated as a behavioral 
measure hedonic capacity (D. A. Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008). In this 
task, participants must choose between two responses that are linked to different probabilities of 
reward. Due to this probabilistic nature, participants cannot infer which stimulus is more 
advantageous based on the outcome of a single trial, but, rather, need to integrate reinforcement 
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history over time in order to optimize their choice. Participants with reduced hedonic capacity 
take significantly more trials to correctly discriminate between the stimuli than participants 
without reduced hedonic capacity.  
Psychophysiological methods and behavioral paradigms have been employed in an 
attempt to identify objective indices of reward system activity and the capacity to respond to 
rewarding stimuli (i.e. hedonic capacity). Psychophysiological investigations have identified 
resting frontal delta electroencephalography (EEG) activity a possible index of mesolimbic 
reward system activity and hedonic capacity (Knyazev, 2012). A follow-up study to Pizzagalli et 
al. (2008) found that greater reward learning on the probabilistic reward task was linearly related 
to increased resting rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) delta activity (D. A. Pizzagalli et al., 
2009). 
Anhedonia is a common subjective experience among individuals with depression 
defined by attenuated hedonic capacity including: reduced motivation, reduced anticipatory 
pleasure (wanting), reduced consummatory pleasure (liking), and deficits in reinforcement 
learning (Shankman et al., 2014). Rizvi, Lambert, and Kennedy (2018) reviewed a wide body of 
literature that suggests that anhedonia is a reflection of deficits in the mesolimbic reward circuit. 
Further, volumetric MRI data from Harvey and colleagues (2007) indicated that self-reported 
trait anhedonia severity was negatively correlated with the volume of the anterior caudate, a key 
region in the mesolimbic reward system. Taken together, both state and trait anhedonia appear to 
result from deficits in mesolimbic reward system processing. Elevated self-reported anhedonia, 
potentially indirectly indicative of defective mesolimbic reward system processing, may thus be 
useful for identifying individuals who will not benefit from a placebo. The Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire is a self-report measure that has demonstrated reliability for 
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distinguishing comorbid anhedonic symptoms from general depression symptoms, general 
anxiety symptoms, and anxious arousal symptoms (Watson et al., 1995). 
In sum, the MASQ-AD subscale, resting frontal delta EEG activity, and the probabilistic 
reward task have had demonstrated utility as subjective and objective indices of hedonic 
capacity. While resting frontal delta EEG activity is thought to more directly measure 
mesolimbic reward system activity, the probabilistic reward task and the MASQ-AD subscale 
may be indirect indicators of mesolimbic reward system dysfunction that could be useful for 
determining a placebo response likelihood. 
Study Aims 
As the expectation of reward is integral to the placebo response, this study sought to 
examine whether anhedonia, an indirect indicator of mesolimbic reward system dysfunction, 
may moderate the placebo response in individuals with depression. Our team is unaware of any 
studies that have investigated whether anhedonia, a state commonly experienced during episodes 
of depression, may moderate the placebo response. Reward system processing capacity was 
estimated via behavioral performance on a probabilistic reward task indexing reward learning, 
indexed via rACC Delta EEG activity, and indirectly assessed via self-reported scores on the 
MASQ Anhedonic Depression subscale to explore their possible role as moderators of placebo 
treatment response. 
Hypotheses 
We hypothesized that PRT, and rACC Delta would positively correlate among one 
another based on prior studies that suggest they each index the mesolimbic reward system from 
the separate units of analysis of behavioral (PRT) and physiological (rACC Delta). Further, we 
hypothesized that self-report eleveaded MASQ-AD scores would indicate mesolimbic reward 
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system dysfunction, and possibily correspond to attenuated reward learning on the PRT and 
reduced mesolimbic reward system activity indexed by rACC Delta. Further, we hypothesized 
that individuals randomized to receive a placebo who exhibit impaired mesolimibic reward 
system functioning will have the smallest reductions in HAM-D as indicated by: 1) greater self-
reported anhedonic depression symptoms, 2) reduced rACC delta EEG, and 3) reduced reward 
learning on a probabilistic reward task, indicating reduced hedonic capacity. 
Method 
Participants  
A multicenter randomized clinical trial screened (n=634) and enrolled (n=296) 
outpatients (age, 18-65 years) meeting criteria for MDD without psychotic features based on the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders between July 29, 2011, and 
December 15, 2015 (Establishing Moderators and Biosignatures of Antidepressant Response for 
Clinical Care [EMBARC]). Participants had a Quick Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology 
score of 14 or higher (Rush et al., 2003), indicating moderate depression at both the screening 
and randomization visits. To minimize clinical heterogeneity, only individuals reporting early- 
onset (before age 30 years) MDD that was chronic (episode duration >2 years) or recurrent (≥2 
recurrences including the current episode) were enrolled. Additional exclusion criteria are 
published elsewhere (Pizzgalli et al., 2018) and are available in the supplemental materials. The 
study was approved by the institutional review board at all four sites (University of Michigan – 
Ann Arbor, Columbia University, University of Texas Southwest Medical Center – Dallas, and 
Massachusetts General Hospital). A detailed description of the study design, randomization 
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procedures, and power analyses has been published elsewhere (Trivedi et al., 2016) and is 
available in the supplemental materials. 
Table 6: Descriptives for the Placebo Study 
 Responder Non-Responder   
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t p 
Baseline Depression 18.38 (4.11) 18.75 (4.44) -.410 .682 
PRT Change (B2-B1) 0.09 (0.19) 0.03 (0.18) 1.555 .123 
MASQ Anhedonia (reverse coded) 1.93 (0.79) 1.59 (0.76) 2.150 .034 
rACC Delta -3.22 (0.17) -3.29 (0.23) 1.945 .055 
rACC Theta -3.35 (0.17) -3.44 (0.21) 2.243 .027 




Age Range 18-65 19-57   
Sex  M=14, F=23 M=27, F=36   
 
EEG Recordings and Preprocessing 
Of the 296 who were randomized, 266 had electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings, 
248 had usable EEG data. Data were collected until 100 participants were randomized to receive 
a placebo, completed the study, and had useable data. Resting EEG data were recorded at 
baseline and 1 week after trial onset, and rACC delta (1.5-6Hz), theta (6.5-8Hz), alpha (8.5-10Hz 
& 10.5-12Hz), beta (12.5-18Hz & 21.5-30Hz), and gamma (36.5-44Hz) EEG activity was 
extracted using source localization. 
At all sites, resting EEG was recorded during four 2-minute periods, half with eyes closed 
and half with eyes open in a counterbalanced order (Pizzgalli et al., 2018). Because different 
EEG acquisition systems were used across sites, a manual was developed to standardize 
recordings and instructions provided to participants. To minimize cross-site differences, EEG 
data were interpolated to a common montage (72 channels) and sample rate (256 Hz), and a 
single, standardized analysis pipeline (Tenke et al., 2017) was implemented to extract 
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nonoverlapping, artifact- free, 2-second epochs for source localization analyses (Pizzgalli et al., 
2018) 
Source Localization Analyses 
Source localization analyses were conducted using low- resolution electromagnetic 
tomography (Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999; D. Pizzagalli et al., 2001), which infers the intracranial 
generators of scalp-recorded EEG signals and followed identical procedures as in prior studies 
(Korb, Hunter, Cook, & Leuchter, 2009; D. Pizzagalli et al., 2001). A full description of the 
analytical strategies are available in the supplemental materials, which were adapted from the 
first EMBARC study to publish on these data (Pizzagalli et al.; 2018). Current density within the 
delta band (1.5-6Hz) was extracted from the rACC cluster (14 voxels) previously associated with 
better antidepressant outcome (D. Pizzagalli et al., 2001). This cluster has been previously used 
(Korb et al., 2009) and spatially overlapped with the cluster linked to treatment outcome in 2 
additional EEG studies (Mulert et al., 2007; Rentzsch, Adli, Wiethoff, Gómez-Carrillo De 
Castro, & Gallinat, 2014).  
Probabilistic Reward Task 
The probabilistic reward task (D. A. Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005) utilizes signal-
detection theory to assess a participant’s propensity to modify their behavior based on prior 
reinforcements. Participants are asked to select whether stimulus A or B was presented by 
responding with either A or B. Performance on the task can be analyzed in terms of 
discriminability and response bias. Discriminability refers to the participants’ ability to 
differentiate between the two stimuli. Response bias refers to the participants’ propensity to 
select response A or B irrespective of the stimulus presented. Prior research has demonstrated 
that reinforcing one stimulus more frequently than the other following a correct response 
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produces a systematic preference for the response paired with a more frequent reward 
(McCarthy, 1991). The more frequently reward stimulus allocation and the key presses are 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Hedonic capacity was behaviorally operationalized as reward learning during a 
probabilistic reward task. The primary variable of interest is change in response bias scores from 
the first to the second block, which is thought to index reward learning (D. A. Pizzagalli et al., 
2005). Discriminability scores were included as a covariate within the reward learning analyses. 
Statistical Analysis 
To address hypothesis 1, we estimated the relationships among the behavioral (PRT 
reward learning), self-reported MASQ-AD, and psychophysiological (rACC delta EEG) indices 
of hedonic capacity using Pearson’s r. Follow-up multiple linear regression analyses including 
age and sex as covariates were conducted to control for extraneous variance.  
To address hypotheses 2-4, the psychophysiological (rACC delta EEG) and behavioral 
(PRT reward learning) indices of hedonic capacity, along with self-reported MASQ-AD 
(indirectly indicating impaired hedonic capacity), were entered into independent multiple linear 
regression analyses with initial severity, age, and sex as covariates in each model. A stepwise 
multiple linear regression model was utilized to explore the unique variance explained by the 
significant moderators of the placebo response from the analyses for hypotheses 2-4. 
Results 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we did not find significant relationships among the two 
hypothesized indices of mesolimbic reward system hedonic capacity: behavioral reward learning 
on the probabilistic reward task and psychophysiological rACC delta EEG, nor on the indirect 
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measure of hedonic capacity using the self-reported anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood 
and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (see Table 7: Correlations among study variables). Self-
reported anhedonic depression symptoms were unrelated to rACC delta EEG activity, r(98)=.01. 
Controlling for age, sex, and task discriminability, did not alter this pattern of findings: reward 
learning on the probabilistic reward task was not associated with self-reported anhedonia scores ( 
Table 8) or rACC delta EEG (Table 9). 
Table 7: Correlations among study variables 
 











Baseline 1 .25* -.10 -.08 -.09 .15 .18 
HDRS Change .25* 1 .11 .10 .22* .32** .30** 
Discriminability -.10 .11 1 -.08 -.14 .18 .09 
Response Bias  -.08 .10 -.08 1 .1 .18 .15 
MASQ AD -.09 .22* -.14 .1 1 .01 .09 
rACC Delta .15 .32** .18 .18 .01 1 .83** 
rACC Theta .18 .30** .09 .15 .09 .83** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
 
Table 8: Self-reported anhedonia & behavioral reward learning 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 1.933 98.789 .000 .505 
PRT Discriminability -.408 1.830 .179 .019 
PRT Response Bias Reward Learning .376 .787 .377 .008 
 
Table 9: rACC delta & behavioral reward learning 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept -
3.234 
1415.866 .000 .937 
PRT Discriminability .142 3.111 .081 .032 
PRT Response Bias Reward Learning .185 2.613 .109 .027 
Age -.003 3.740 .056 .038 
Sex -.007 .478 .491 .005 
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In support of hypothesis 2, the anhedonia subscale of the MASQ was a significant 
moderator of the magnitude of changes in depression symptoms during the placebo trial, 
accounting for 6.0% of the variance (see Table 10). Higher baseline self-reported anhedonic 
depression symptoms were associated with attenuated reductions in depression symptoms over 
the course of the randomized control trial, when controlling for baseline depression symptoms, 
age, and sex. The baseline depression covariate accounted for a significant amount of variance 
within the model. Age and sex were non-significant covariates (age was marginal).  
Table 10: Moderating effects of anhedonia on treatment response 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept -2.029 .221 .640 .002 
 Baseline Depression .466 8.192 .005** .079 
Age -.100 3.370 .070 .034 
Sex .190 .276 .600 .003 
MASQ-AD 2.206 6.091 .015* .060 
 
In partial support of hypothesis 3, the hypothesized psychophysiological index of hedonic 
capacity (rACC delta) was significantly associated with the magnitude of change in Depression 
scores from before to after the placebo intervention (see  
Table 11). However, the relationship was in the opposite of what was expected. We 
hypothesized that increased rACC delta EEG activity, potentially indicating reduced hedonic 
capacity, would predict an attenuated placebo response. However, we found that decreased 
rACC delta EEG was associated with an attenuated placebo response. To further explore the 
relationship of our psychophysiological measures to the placebo response, we conducted a post-
hoc correlation analyses among the other rACC EEG bands (theta, alpha, beta, and gamma). We 
found that rACC theta EEG accounted for a greater proportion of the variance in the placebo 
response than rACC delta EEG (see Table 12). 
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Table 11: Moderating effects of rACC delta EEG on treatment response 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 31.3
70 
7.511 .007** .073 
Baseline Depression .364 4.988 .028* .050 
Age -
.079 
2.063 .154 .021 
Sex .134 .141 .708 .001 
rACC delta 8.71
5 
6.867 .010** .067 
 
Table 12: Moderating effects of rACC theta EEG on treatment response 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept 34.350 7.232 .008 .071 
Baseline Depression .355 4.688 .033 .047 
Age -.097 3.176 .078 .032 
Sex .126 .125 .725 .001 
rACC theta 8.976 6.579 .012 .065 
 
Inconsistent with hypothesis 4, the behavioral index of hedonic capacity (PRT reward 
learning), did not moderate the degree to which participants experienced benefits from the 
placebo (Table 13), when controlling for baseline depression symptoms, age, and sex. 
Table 13: Relationship of rACC theta to behavioral reward learning 
Source B F Sig. R2 
Intercept -.572 .016 .900 .000 
 Baseline Depression .464 7.675 .007 .075 
Age -.096 2.930 .090 .030 
Sex .138 .140 .710 .001 
PRT Response Bias Reward Learning 4.459 1.309 .256 .014 
PRT Discriminability 3.497 1.623 .206 .017 
 
When self-reported index of anhedonic depression symptoms (MASQ AD), rACC theta 
EEG, and their interaction were entered into a stepwise multiple linear regression analysis 
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predicting changes in depression symptoms, they were able to estimate 20.6% of the variance 
(see Table 14 for a breakdown of each step; see Table 15 for the estimated model). Each variable 
contributed a significant amount of unique variance and the independent variables did not 
interact with each other. 








1 – Baseline, Age, and Sex .103 .103 3.671 .015 
2 – Model 1 + MASQ Anhedonia .157 .054 6.091 .015 
3 – Model 2 + rACC Theta .206 .049 5.807 .018 
4 – Model 3 + interaction of Theta and MASQ AD .211 .005 0.565 .454 
 
Table 15: Anhedonia, rACC theta, and antidepressant treatment response 
Source B F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept 27.259 4.490 .037* .046 
Baseline depression .399 6.130 .015* .061 
Age -.087 2.649 .107 .027 
Sex .231 .431 .513 .005 
MASQ-AD 2.020 5.326 .023* .054 
rACC theta 8.279 5.807 .018* .058 
 
Discussion 
Data from the present study provide further insight into the variables that may moderate 
placebo treatment response. We found that reduced self-reported anhedonic depression 
symptoms and higher pre-treatment resting rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) 
electroencephalography (EEG) theta activity accounted for more than 20 percent of the variance 
in placebo treatment response.  
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In contrast to our initial hypothesis, we did not find evidence of convergent validity 
among the behavioral (reward learning on the probabilistic reward task [PRT]) and physiological 
(rACC delta activity) indices of hedonic capacity measured in this study. Further, we did not find 
a relationship of anhedonia (MASQ-AD) to either of the hypothesized indices of hedonic 
capacity. Consistent with Wacker, Dillon, & Pizzagalli (2009), change in response bias scores 
were not associated with the MASQ-AD subscale; however, in contrast to that study, this study 
did not find a significant link between PRT reward learning and rACC delta EEG activity. As 
described by Knyazev (2012), resting delta EEG oscillations may be influenced by appetitive and 
homeostatic processes such as hunger, cravings for substances of abuse, and sexual arousal. It is 
possible that extraneous appetitive or homeostatic variables that we did not measure, such as 
hunger, may have influenced our pattern of findings. Taken together, this study was unable to 
link the two suggested behavioral and psychophysiological indices of reward system activity, 
and neither demonstrated a relationship to self-reported anhedonic depression scores.  
This study provides new insights into the role of self-reported anhedonic depression 
symptoms in moderating the placebo response. This study found that participants with impaired 
reward processing, indicated by self-reported anhedonia symptoms, were significantly less likely 
to benefit from a placebo. The moderating effect of self-reported anhedonia this study detected is 
consistent with prior literature linking reward processing with the placebo effect, albeit indirectly 
(Benedetti et al., 2005; Faria et al., 2008; Murray & Stoessl, 2013; Peciña et al., 2015; 
Schweinhardt et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2007). Anhedonia is an indicator of attenuated reward 
processing (Gong et al., 2018), and a large body of literature has identified the expectation of 
reward as an essential ingredient in the placebo response (Murray & Stoessl, 2013), which may 
indicate that anhedonia should be associated with a reduced likelihood of a placebo response. In 
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this sample, placebo non-responders self-reported significantly higher anhedonia scores relative 
to placebo responders. Taken together, these results, along with the prior literature, suggest that 
without in-tact reward system processing, the possibility of a placebo response is reduced.  
The hypothesis that EEG activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) would 
modulate placebo treatment response was partially supported. Based on prior literature 
suggesting that resting delta EEG activity is a useful index of mesolimbic reward system activity 
(Wacker et al., 2009), this study hypothesized that increased rACC delta EEG activity would 
attenuate the degree of placebo response. The data from this study did find that rACC delta 
activity moderated the degree of placebo response; however, this relationship was opposite of the 
direction hypothesized: decreased rACC delta EEG activity, not increased, was associated with 
an attenuated placebo response. Further, upon post-hoc analysis we found that rACC theta EEG 
activity accounted for a greater proportion of the variance in placebo response than rACC delta 
EEG activity. Given the high degree of intercorrelation among EEG frequency bands (Lazarev, 
1998), it is likely that the moderating relationship of rACC theta EEG influenced the relationship 
of rACC delta to placebo treatment response. The moderating effect of pre-treatment rACC theta 
EEG activity is consistent with prior studies identifying rACC theta as a robust predictor of 
active antidepressant treatment response (D. A. Pizzagalli, 2011). This study extends these prior 
studies providing evidence of rACC theta EEG activity’s potential utility as a moderator of both 
“active” antidepressant and placebo treatment response (Arns et al., 2015). 
Although the link between higher baseline rACC theta activity and antidepressant non-
response has been well-established in meta-analytical studies (Pizagalli, 2011), previous 
investigations have been unable to explain why (e.g. Arns, 2015; Pizzagalli, 2018). It is possible 
that elevated rACC theta activity is characteristic of a subtype of depression that is particularly 
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amenable to pharmacotherapy and the placebo effect. Marchetti (2012) reviewed a body of 
literature exploring the relationship of default mode network dysfunction to a potential type of 
recurrent depression. Given the central role of the rACC in the default mode network, it is 
possible that rACC theta activity is associated with a type of recurrent depression that exhibits 
dysfunction within this region. 
Conclusions 
Together, rACC theta activity and self-reported anhedonia scores were able to account 
for 20.6% of the variance in placebo treatment response. More specifically, higher pre-treatment 
theta activity and lower pre-treatment self-reported anhedonia scores were associated with a 
greater decrease in depression symptoms from before to after the intervention. If replicated, these 
findings may allow for identification of individuals who may benefit from a placebo and allow 
them to forego intolerable side effects that may present as a barrier to depression symptom 
reduction. 
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Chapter 4: Cognitive Defusion 
Introduction 
Cognitive theories of major depression (Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) propose that repetitive, negative automatic thoughts about the self, 
the world, and the future characterize depressive cognition. Cognitive therapy, a component of 
cognitive behavioral therapy, was developed to challenge and change negative automatic 
thoughts associated with depression toward less emotionally salient and more helpful thoughts 
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Cognitive behavioral therapy is widely considered to be 
the gold standard treatment for depression (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). 
A study by Deldin and colleagues (2001) provided support for the cognitive theory of 
depression using neurophysiological methods. Deldin et al. reported that healthy controls 
demonstrated preferential processing of positively valenced stimuli relative to negatively 
valenced stimuli, whereas individuals with depression did not demonstrate such an affective bias. 
More specifically, they found that healthy controls, but not individuals with depression, 
demonstrated an enhanced P300 event-related potential during encoding of positively valenced 
stimuli, relative to negatively valenced stimuli, and P300 was attenuated during recognition of 
positively valenced stimuli, relative to negatively valenced stimuli. Follow-up studies examining 
the slow-wave ERP component provided further evidence for a lack of a positivity bias in 
depression (Deveney & Deldin, 2004; Shestyuk, Deldin, Brand, & Deveney, 2005). Taken 
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together, these studies suggest that individuals with depression do not demonstrate the bias 
towards positively valenced stimuli that is detected in healthy control samples. Further, through 
the recording of event related potentials (ERPs), these studies were able to overcome self-report 
biases in order to examine cognition in depression to provide insight into the black box of the 
mind (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002; Garcia-Toro & Aguirre, 2007; Trivedi & 
Greer, 2014). 
Two frequently studied ERPs are P300, an event-related potential with a peak positive 
polarity approximately 300ms post-stimulus onset, and No-Go N200, an ERP component with a 
peak negative polarity approximately 250-400 milliseconds post-stimulus (Patel & Azzam, 
2005). P300 is an event-related potential with a peak positive polarity approximately 300ms 
post-stimulus onset (Duncan et al., 2009) and robustly elicited during oddball tasks, such as the 
Go/NoGo task, in which a subject responds to an infrequent target stimulus in a series of 
frequent nontarget stimuli (Duncan et al., 2009). Common analytical strategies for quantifying 
P300 and N200 are to measure a) latency from stimulus presentation to peak positive amplitude 
and b) peak amplitude (Duncan et al., 2009). P300 amplitude is thought to index resource 
allocation for higher-order cognitive operations involved in stimulus evaluation and 
categorization (Donchin & Coles, 1988; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981). P300 latency is thought to 
index classification speed, or the time required to detect and evaluate the target stimulus (Kutas, 
Mccarthy, & Donchin, 1977; Magliero, Bashore, Coles, & Donchin, 1984). No-go N200 
amplitude has been argued by some to index response inhibition (Eimer, 1993; Van Boxtel, 
2001), while others have argued for the conflict monitoring hypothesis of N200 stating that N200 
is not only associated with response inhibition, but also response execution (Donkers & Van 
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Boxtel, 2004; Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2003). 
 
P300 event related brain potential has received substantial attention in cognitive and 
affective neuroscience investigations due to its association with depression symptomology 
(Davidson et al., 2002; Garcia-Toro & Aguirre, 2007; Trivedi & Greer, 2014). Prolonged P300 
latency has been associated with affective symptoms of depression, whereas reduced P300 
amplitude has been associated with psychotic symptoms co-occuring with depression (Karaaslan, 
Gonul, Oguz, Erdinc, & Esel, 2003). More recently, Tripathi and colleagues (2015) found a 
linear relationship between P300 latency and depression severity whereby longer P300 latencies 
were associated with higher depression severity. In addition to the early evidence by Deldin and 
colleagues (2001) described above, evidence for biases during the processing of emotional 
stimuli in individuals with depression was also obtained by Cavanagh and Geisler (2006) for 
midline electrode sites. They recorded ERPs during a visual oddball task in which neutral faces 
served as standards and happy or fearful faces were targets, and they found that participants with 
depression had reduced P300 amplitude to happy faces when compared to individuals without 
depression. Providing further evidence of altered processing of facial stimuli in depression 
several studies have reported reduced right posterior No-Go N200 amplitude in response to facial 
stimuli among individuals with depression (Keller, Gergen, Miller, & Deldin, 2000; Sumich, 
Kumari, Heasman, Gordon, & Brammer, 2006). During an investigation of emotional biases in 
depression, Sass et al. (2014) reported that individuals with depression lacked the attentional bias 
towards positively valenced stimuli that is present in healthy controls, as indexed by N200 
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during an emotional stroop task. Taken together, No-Go N200 and P300 may be useful indices 
for studying the cognitive and affective processes that are disrupted in depression 
More recent studies have shifted focus to identifying how these neurophysiological 
indices of cognitive and affective dysfunction may relate to depression treatment. Karaaslan et 
al., (2003) found that auditory P300 latency in depression decreased from pre to post medication 
treatment to a comparable latency with the healthy control sample, and no significant differences 
in P300 latency change were detected by medication type. More recently, Işintaş, Ak, Erdem, 
Öz, & Özgen (2012) reported that prolonged pre-treatment P300 latency in depression was 
associated with positive pharmacotherapy treatment response, and treatment responders 
demonstrated a “normalized” P300 latency. Published studies investigating the relationship of 
N200 to depression treatment have mostly been negative (e.g. Liogier D’Ardhuy et al., 1999). In 
sum, during treatment, deficits in cognitive and affective processing, as indexed by P300 latency, 
may improve during treatment for depression. 
Although many studies have investigated the relationship of cortical physiology to 
pharmacological interventions for depression (see Kemp, Gordon, Rush, & Williams [2008] for a 
review), there have been few published repeated-measures investigations of cortical physiology 
patterns over the course of psychotherapy interventions. Ge et al. (2011) reported prolonged 
P300 latency at baseline in participants with internet addiction disorder, and they found that 
positive response to CBT was associated with significant decreases in P300 latency. Moscovitch 
(2011) found that increased right relative to left to increased left relative to right changes in 
resting EEG alpha power in the frontal regions was associated with cognitive behavioral therapy 
(CBT) treatment gains in individuals with social anxiety disorder. The present study recruited a 
sample of college students scoring highly on a depression inventory to explore whether a brief 
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skill building session, focused on identifying ways to reduce cognitive and emotional biases, 
might be associated with changes in neurophysiological indices of cognitive and affective 
processing. 
Cognitive Defusion 
Cognitive defusion is a mindfulness-based technique that aims to reduce distress 
associated with negative automatic thoughts by “de-fusing” or creating psychological distance 
from thoughts (Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 2004). In contrast to traditional cognitive 
behavior therapy, mindfulness-based interventions do not aim to change the content or the 
frequency of thoughts, but, rather, individuals’ relationship with their thoughts (see Kross, 2001 
for a comparison). The core aspect of mindfulness-based therapies is to shift from a self-
immersed perspective where thoughts are viewed as reality to a self-distanced perspective where 
thoughts are treated as “just thoughts”, which may or may not have grounding in reality. During 
defusion exercises, individuals practice describing their thoughts in the third person (e.g. “I 
notice I am having the thought that …”) or they practice exercises such as repeating a thought 
over and over again or singing out thoughts in order to reduce the thought’s believability. The 
degree to which individuals are able to defuse or create psychological distance from their 
thoughts has been reported to mediate the relationship between rumination and depression 
symptomology and may facilitate adaptive self-reflection (Mori & Tanno, 2015). Cognitive 
defusion has demonstrated efficacy comparable to the cognitive therapy technique of cognitive 
restructuring for reducing distress associated with disturbing thoughts (B. J. Deacon, Fawzy, 
Lickel, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011; Yovel, Mor, & Shakarov, 2014) and has received empirical 
support as a standalone intervention for the treatment of depression (Masuda et al., 2010) and 
eating and body image concerns (Mandavia et al., 2015).  
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Study aims 
This study sought to examine whether taking a step back from self-immersed ruminative 
thinking via a cognitive defusion technique might be associated with an improvement in 
cognitive and affective processing, as indexed by P300 and No-Go N200. 
Hypotheses 
This study hypothesized that 1) a brief cognitive defusion intervention will be associated 
with a decrease self-reported negative emotion associated with a difficult situation, while a 
control condition that provided psychoeducation on sleep hygiene will not be associated with 
significant reductions in negative emotions. 2) P300 latency will decrease from before to after 
the intervention in the cognitive defusion condition, but not the control condition, and may 
demonstrate a relative bias towards positive stimuli relative to negative stimuli. 3) No-Go N200 
amplitude, indexing attentional processes recruited for response inhibition, will increase in right 
posterior regions and demonstrate an enhancement towards positively valenced facial stimuli 
from before to after the intervention. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through the University of Michigan undergraduate 
psychology subject pool and the University of Michigan Health Research, an online portal where 
people interested in participating in research can create a profile indicating that they would like 
to be contacted (IRB number: HUM00004760). Inclusion criteria were: (1) vision equal to or 
better than 20/30 on a Snelling chart, with correction if necessary; (2) no chronic medical 
condition (such as seizure disorders), developmental disability or organic brain syndrome such as 
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mood disorders secondary to head injuries that could affect the ERP results; (3) Patient Health 
Questionnaire-9 depression score greater than 10; and (4) right handed (to control for brain 
hemispheric lateralization that affects the ERP; confirmed by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory). This study was approved by the University of Michigan Institutional Review Board 
(IRB number: HUM00105105).  
A total of 51 participants were consented, 46 completed the study, and 44 were included 
in the final analyses (see Table 16: Descriptives for the Defusion Study). Four participants ended 
their study participation early due to other commitments, and one participant was ineligible due 
to a Patient Health Questionnaire score less than 10 upon study arrival. Two study completers 
were not included in final analyses due to self-reported bipolar disorder and self-reported history 
of stroke.  
Table 16: Descriptives for the Defusion Study 
 Defusion Sleep Hygiene p-value 
Age 20.6±2.7 20.2±1.6 ns 
Sex (F/M) 14/7 17/6 ns 
BDI 25.5±7.5 26.7±6.4 ns 
RRS 61.0±8.3 61.8±6.4 ns 
CFQ 35.6±7.6 37.0±4.4 ns 
DAS 160.7±24.8 155.7±10.5 ns 
MASQ-GD 118.6±17.4 120.8±21.4 ns 
MASQ-AD 103.2±6.3 104.0±5.6 ns 
MASQ-AA 37.8±11.0 40.6±8.7 ns 
 
Procedure 
This cross-sectional study involved a baseline battery of computerized questionnaires 
assessing various facets of mental health, which were completed during the ERP hookup, 
followed by a mood induction, an emotional go no-go task, either an active or control 
intervention, a second mood induction, and a post-intervention emotional go no-go task.  
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Figure 2: Defusion study flowchart 
 
For the mood induction, participants were asked to think about a difficult life situation 
that has been bothering them the most recently. After the mood induction, participants completed 
a visual analog scale rating the intensity of positive (i.e. good, happy, calm, peaceful, excited) 
and negative emotions experienced (i.e. bad, guilt, fear, nervousness, sadness, anger, disgust). 
Next, participants completed an emotional go no-go task where they were asked to respond to 
certain valenced facial stimuli and ignore distractor neutrally valenced stimuli (e.g. press the 
space bar for happy faces, but not neutral faces) or, during other blocks, respond to neutrally 
valenced stimuli and ignore the distractor valanced (angry, happy, sad) stimuli. Participants were 
then randomized to receive either a cognitive defusion training session (see Appendix 3 for the 
cognitive defusion script) or a control condition (sleep hygiene; see Appendix 4 for the sleep 
hygiene script). After the intervention, participants in the control condition were asked to think 
about the same life difficulty again, while participants in the cognitive defusion group were 
asked to think about the same life difficulty, this time using the skills learned during the training 
session. Participants then completed a second visual analog assessment. Participants were then 
asked to complete the ERP tasks and for a second time. 
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Cognitive Defusion 
Each participant engaged in a two-part introduction to cognitive defusion. The 
information provided is based upon the relational frame theory and acceptance and commitment 
therapy for depression (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). The first 10-15 minutes of the session 
involved introducing individuals to the core concepts of ACT. Specifically, participants were 
introduced to the idea that attempting to “control” the mind can contribute to negative moods, 
and that willingness to experience unpleasant emotions can actually reduce them. The latter half 
of the session included a description of several methods for defusing negative automatic 
thoughts. Participants were given strategies to create psychological distance from their thoughts, 
and were informed that three ways to distance themselves from such thoughts include (a) repeat 
the difficult thought until you can notice the acoustic dimensions of the thought (b) treat the 
difficult thought as a monster on a bus you are driving (c) treat “the mind” as an external event; 
almost a separate person and thank your mind for that thought. The entire session lasted 
approximately 30 min, during which the experimenter was seated next to the participant with a 
small table between. To ensure full understanding of the information, several reality-based 
examples were provided with each concept, participants were given a review sheet, and prior to 
the next EEG recording session, participants were asked to review the material verbally with the 
experimenter. If necessary, additional examples were provided, and, if they chose, participants 
were given the opportunity to practice distancing themselves from their thoughts. 
Emotional Go/NoGo 
For the ERP recording, participants were seated in a darkened room 120 cm from the 
LCD monitor (60 Hz refresh rate). Participants completed twelve blocks of an emotional 
Go/NoGo task using facial stimuli of differing valences (happy, sad, angry, neutral) using the 
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keyboard while having their EEG recorded. All face stimuli consisted of grey-scaled faces with 
happy, sad, angry, and neutral expression from 32 individuals (9 female) taken from the 
NimStim set (Tottenham et al., 2009; http:// www.macbrain.org). In order to control 
race/ethnicity effect on amplitudes or latencies of ERP components, only Caucasian faces were 
used. All visual stimuli were created and presented via E-Prime software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh).  
 Each block contained two emotional valences, one as the target (Go) and one as the non-
target (No-Go) stimuli, which were pseudorandomized across the blocks to control for 
presentation order effects. Three combinations of emotions (Happy-Neutral, Sad-Neutral, Angry-
Neutral) were used as both the Go and NoGo stimuli. In order to obtain enough trails to complete 
the ERP analysis, these sets were repeated with a reversed order of stimulus presentation. Prior 
to each block, participants were instructed to respond to a particular emotion by pressing the 
spacebar, but not to respond to any other emotions as quickly as possible without making 
mistakes. In each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms followed by a facial image, 
which was presented for 150 ms on the center of the screen. The maximum amount of time to 
respond was1500ms. After completing a block, participants were shown the instructions for the 
next block followed by a 2000 ms fixation cross. Overall, they completed 50 trials per block (35 
Go [70%] and 15 NoGo [30%]) in each of twelve blocks of the experiment, with a total of 600 
trials. 
Physiological preprocessing 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 32 electrodes using an ActiCAP 32 
(Brain Products GmbH, Germany) EEG cap. The electrode positions include all standard 
positions of the International 10/20 system. Common recording reference was set at FCz and 
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impedance was kept below 5 k Ω during the course of the study. Signals were digitally sampled 
at a sampling interval of 200 µS and a sampling rate of 5000 Hz. An electro-oculogram (EOG) 
electrode was placed beneath the left eye and at F7 to monitor eye blinks. 
Vision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain Products GmbH, Germany) was used to preprocess and 
analyze the EEG data. P300 and No-Go N200 were analyzed including 9 caudal and lateral sites 
(F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4) consistent with scalp distribution analyses (D. Deacon, 
Breton, Ritter, & Vaughan, 1991). EEG data were re-referenced to Cz. A band-pass filter was set 
for 0.01 to 30 Hz, and data were down-sampled to 250Hz. The EOG artifact was corrected via 
the ocular correction independent components analysis (ICA) algorithm included within Vision 
Analyzer. The data were divided into 1150ms segments for each trial, beginning 150 ms prior to 
stimulus onset. Trials were baseline corrected and any trials containing any artifacts or were over 
80µV in amplitude were eliminated before averaging. There were no significant between-group 
differences in NoGo response accuracy for any valence manipulation; therefore, to maximize 
statistical power, both correct and incorrect NoGo trials were included in the NoGo average. 
Further, NoGo waveforms with and without incorrect trials were visually inspected and did not 
exhibit any differences. To examine the relationship of the extracted ERP waveforms to prior 
literature, temporal principal components analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation was used. For 
the pre-intervention no-go trials, six temporal components were extracted corresponding to 
positive and negative fluctuations. The estimated P300 and No-Go N200 component windows 
were used to extract average amplitude for both go and no-go trials before and after the 
intervention. 
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Statistical Analysis 
All statistical analyses were performed using the SPSS software package (Version 24.0, 
SPSS Inc, Chicago, USA). Outliers, defined as data points that fall beyond two standard 
deviations, were removed prior to statistical analyses. Significance values were calculated using 
the Wilks’ lambda for the multivariate tests and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction for the tests 
of within-participant effects. Higher-order interactions for the ANOVA analyses were required to 
be significant for a lower-order interaction to be examined and for pair-wise comparisons to be 
conducted. Recruitment source was dropped from analyses that demonstrated no significant 
baseline differences. 
Visual Analog Scale (VAS) data analysis 
Baseline VAS responses for positively valenced and negatively valenced VAS scores 
were analyzed separately using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 mixed-effects ANOVA with time point (pre and 
post mood induction), Intervention (Defusion, control), Recruitment Source (UM subject pool, 
community), and emotion (happy, calm, excited, proud, good) for positively valenced emotions 
and a 2 x 2 x 2 x 7 mixed-effects ANOVA for negatively valenced emotions (sad, angry, scared, 
nervous, disgusted, bad, guilty). To examine for intervention effects, the time point effect was 
adjusted to add the additional level of VAS data collected after the post intervention mood 
induction. To test for post mood induction pre-post intervention effects among conditions, 
separate 2 x 5 and 2 x 7 ANOVAs were conducted to compare positively and negatively 
valenced emotions, respectively, from after the first mood induction to after the second mood 
induction.  
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Behavioral Data Analysis 
Baseline reaction times (RT) to go stimuli on the emotional Go/NoGo task were 
examined using 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with intervention (cognitive defusion or 
control) and recruitment source as between-groups factors, and valence (angry, sad, happy) as 
the within-groups factor. Baseline accuracy in responding to stimuli was examined using a 2 x 2 
x 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with intervention (cognitive defusion or control) and 
recruitment source as between-groups factors, and valence (angry, sad, happy) and trial type (go, 
no-go) as the within-groups factors. To examine for changes from before to after the 
intervention, an additional variable of time point (post mood induction 1, post mood induction 2) 
was added as a within-group factor to these models. 
Physiological data analysis 
Baseline No-Go N200 and P300 latencies to no-go stimuli were subjected to a 3 x 2 x 2 
mixed-effects ANOVA with valence (happy, sad, angry) as the within-group factors and 
recruitment source (UM subject pool, community) and intervention (cognitive defusion or 
control) as the between-group factors, controlling for baseline emotional state. Baseline P300 
amplitudes were also subjected to a mixed-effects ANOVA with the additional variable of 
stimuli (Go/NoGo). To examine for changes from before to after the intervention, an additional 
variable of time point (post mood induction 1, post mood induction 2) was added to these 
models. The clinical data obtained (i.e. Beck Depression Inventory II, Mood and Anxiety 
Symptom Questionnaire, Ruminative Responses Scale, Cognitive Defusion Questionnaire, 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale) were correlated with the electrophysiological findings. 
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Results 
Negative emotions: changes detected 
Between-subjects main effects for Negative emotion VAS data before and after the first 
think condition and prior to the intervention indicated no baseline differences by recruitment 
source  (F(1,40)=.917, P=.344)  or intervention condition (F(1,40)=3.272, P=.078), and no 
recruitment source by intervention interaction was detected (F(1,40)=.302, p=.586). For negative 
emotions, the mood induction prior to the intervention was effective, as demonstrated by a 
significant Main effect of timepoint (before & after) relative to the pre-intervention mood 
induction indicating that participants had more negative emotions after the Pre-intervention 
mood induction condition than before. (F(1,40)=9.782, p<.01). Changes in negative emotions 
from before to after the Pre-intervention mood induction condition were different by intervention 
group, as indicated by a significant Pre-Post by Intervention interaction (F(1,40)=5.189, 
p=.028); the defusion group had a greater increase in negative emotions from before to after the 
pre-intervention mood induction than SH did. Changes in negative emotions were not different 
by recruitment source as indicated by a non-significant Pre-Post by Group interaction 
(F(1,40)=0.018, p=0.893). 
Significant differences by intervention condition were detected when examining changes 
in negative emotions across the research study as indicated by a Timepoint * Intervention 
interaction (F(2,41)=12.704, p<.01). Individuals in the defusion condition reported experiencing 
significantly less negative emotions after thinking about a difficult life situation using defusion 
than after thinking about the situation prior to learning defusion skills (F(1,20)=42.109, p<.01). 
Individuals in the control condition reported no changes in negative emotions after thinking 
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about a difficult life situation when compared to thinking about the difficult life situation after 
receiving psychoeducation on sleep hygiene (F(1,22)=.165, p=.688). 
 
Figure 3: Negative Emotions by Timepoint 
 
Positive emotions: changes detected 
Between-subjects main effects for Positive emotion VAS data before and after the first 
think condition and prior to the intervention indicated no baseline differences by recruitment 
source (F(1,40)=1.152, P=.289) or intervention condition (F(1,40)=3.155, P=.083), and no 
recruitment source by intervention interaction was detected (F(1,40)=.032, p=.858). For positive 
emotions, the mood induction prior to the intervention was effective, as demonstrated by a 
significant Main effect of timepoint (before & after) relative to the pre-intervention mood 
induction indicating that participants had less positive emotions after the Pre-intervention mood 
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induction condition than before (F(1,40)=4.914, p=.032). Changes in positive emotions from 
before to after the Pre-intervention mood induction condition were not different by intervention 
group or recruitment source, as indicated by a non-significant PrePost by Intervention interaction 
(F(1,40)=.549, p=.463) and a non-significant PrePost by Group interaction (F(1,40)=0.154, 
p=0.697) 
Significant differences by intervention condition were detected when examining changes 
in positive emotions across the research study as indicated by a Timepoint * Intervention 
interaction (F(2,41)=17.284, p<.01). Individuals in the defusion condition reported experiencing 
significantly more positive emotions after thinking about a difficult life situation using defusion 
than after thinking about the situation prior to learning defusion skills (F(1,20)=10.381, p<.01). 
Individuals in the control condition reported no changes in positive emotions after thinking about 
a difficult life situation when compared to thinking about the difficult life situation after 
receiving psychoeducation on sleep hygiene (F(1,22)=3.852, p=.062). 
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A 234-182ms window was estimated from the temporal principal components analysis 
corresponding to N200 and was used to extract average N200 amplitudes across sites. After 
Think 1, Average N200 amplitude across caudal and lateral sites was equivalent across 
recruitment sources (F(1,40)=.369, p=.547) and intervention groups (F(1,40)=1.702, p=.199). 
Significant main effects of caudality (F(2,80)=5.183, p=.026) and laterality (F(2,80)=4.944, 
p=.002) were detected. N200 was larger over anterior sites relative to posterior sites. Consistent 
with the analysis of baseline data, main effects of caudality (F(1,41)=13.491, p<.001) and 
laterality (F(1,41)=12.732, p=0.001) were detected. 
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Figure 5: Changes in N200 Amplitude 
 
A significant Pre-Post*Valence*Intervention interaction was detected (F(2,40)=3.153, 
p=.048). Analysis of the contrasts did not reveal any significant lower order effects. As shown in 
Figure 1, across valences, intervention groups, and timepoint, N200 amplitude varied. For the 
defusion group and on no-go trials with neutral stimuli contrasted by happy go stimuli, the N200 
amplitude exhibited some attenuation, albeit not significantly, indicating that there was a trend 
towards less response inhibition being necessary to inhibit the neutral stimuli. For the sleep 
hygiene group on no-go trials with neutral stimuli contrasted by angry stimuli, the N200 also 
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Figure 6: Changes in the ERP waveform 
 
P300 Amplitude 
P300 was initially analyzed including 9 caudal and lateral sites (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, 
P3, Pz, P4); however, due to null results, the central-parietal site (Pz), where P300 is maximal 
(Polich, 2009), was selected to present P300 latency and amplitude findings here. A 290-475ms 
window was estimated from the temporal principal components analysis corresponding to P300 
and was used to extract average P300 amplitudes at Pz. After Think 1, Average P300 amplitude 
at Pz was equivalent across intervention groups (F(1,40)=.577, P=.452). P300 amplitude was 
significantly greater among the UM psychology subject pool sample when compared to the 
community sample (F(1,40)=4.166, p=0.048); however, no recruitment source by intervention 
group interaction was detected (F(1,40)=.297, p=.589). A significant main effect of stimuli 
valence indicated differences across participants and Go-NoGo trials (F(2,80)=3.940, p=.025). 
P300 amplitude was greatest in response to Angry stimuli (4.51) when compared to Happy (4.09) 
and Sad (4.09) stimuli, which were similar in amplitude. A significant main effect of trial type 
indicated differences between go and no-go trials across participants and valences 
(F(1,80)=10.824, p<.01). P300 amplitude was higher on go trials (4.70) relative to no-go trials 
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(4.06). Pearson’s correlational analyses found significant associations of baseline P300 
amplitude to the anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire for happy-go (r(44)=.276, p=.04), sad-go (r(44)=.254, p=.048), and sad-no-go 
trials (r(44)=.295, p=.026); however, when entered together into a multivariate analysis, no 
significant main effects or interactions were present.  
Consistent with the analysis of baseline data, main effects of valence (F(2,83)=5.878, 
p<.01) and trial type (go, no-go; F(1,42)=4.976, p=0.031) were detected. No significant 
differences in P300 amplitude were present from the first to second time point (F(1,42)=0.127, 
p=0.723), and no differences were detected between intervention groups.(F(1,42)=1.229, 
p=0.274). A non-significant time point by intervention interaction indicated that P300 amplitude 
did not significantly change from before to after the intervention by intervention condition 
(F(1,42)=0.619, p=.436). Consistent with these lower-order findings, a lack of significant higher 
order interactions in the model indicated that, overall, no changes in P300 amplitude were 
detected from before to after the intervention for either intervention group. 
P300 Latency 
P300 elicited from no-go responses at baseline and Pz showed an average latency of 
364ms for angry stimuli, 362 for sad, and 360 for happy. No main effect of valence was detected 
at baseline (F(2,78)=0.838, p=.433). After Think 1, Average P300 latency at Pz was equivalent 
across intervention groups (F(1,40)=.093, P=.761) and recruitment sources (F(1,40)=1.99, 
p=.166), and a recruitment source by intervention interaction was not present at baseline 
(F(1,1.408, p=.242). Baseline P300 latency in this study was unrelated to measures of depression 
or anxiety severity. 
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No significant differences in P300 latency were detected from the first to second time 
point (F(1,42)=1.083, p=0.304), and a PrePost*Intervention interaction found no significant 
differences P300 latency changes between intervention groups (F(1,42)=0.075, p=0.785). 
Consistent with these lower-order findings, a lack of significant higher order interactions in the 
model indicated that, overall, no changes in P300 latency were detected from before to after the 
intervention for either intervention group.  
Behavioral Accuracy 
For emotion go-no go data, accuracy in appropriately responding to go but not no-go 
stimuli was equivalent at baseline across both recruitment sources (F(1,40)=.129, P=.721) and 
intervention conditions (F(1,40)=3.755, P=.060), and no recruitment source by intervention 
interaction was detected (F(1,40)=.746, p=.705). A significant main effect of valence was 
detected, with accuracy being greatest for happy stimuli and lowest for sad stimuli 
(F(2,39)=22.040, p<.01). A significant main effect of Go-NoGo was detected, with accuracy 
being greater on go trials than no-go trials (F(1,40)=9.057, p<.01). 
 An analysis of differences from before to after the intervention revealed a significant 3-
way interaction among time point, trial type (go, no-go), and intervention condition 
(F(1,40)=42.00, p=0.045). Separate analyses by intervention group revealed no differences from 
before to after the intervention in accuracy for the defusion group (F(1,20)=3.488, p=0.077). For 
the sleep hygiene group, accuracy increased on no-go trials and decreased on go trials 
(F(1,22)=34.715, p<.01). 
Behavioral Reaction Time 
For emotion go-no go data, reaction time in responding to go stimuli was equivalent at 
baseline across both recruitment sources (F(1,40)=.258, P=.614) and intervention 
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(F(1,40)=1.037, P=.315) at baseline, and no recruitment source by intervention interaction was 
detected (F(1,40)=1.171, p=.286). A significant main effect of valence was detected, with 
reaction time being quickest for happy stimuli and slowest for sad stimuli (F(2,80)=33.664, 
p<.01). 
An analysis of differences from before to after the intervention revealed significant main 
effects of time point and valence. Average reaction time from before to after the intervention 
decreased by 19 ms across participants in both intervention conditions (F(1,42)=9.418, p=.004). 
This study found a non-significant main effect of intervention (F(0.658, p=0.422), non-
significant time point by intervention interaction (F(1,42)=1.869, p=0.179), and non-significant 
higher-order interactions among time point and intervention variables. Together, these results 
indicated no differences in reaction time by intervention group from before to after the 
intervention. 
Discussion 
Cognitive theories of major depression (Haaga et al., 1991; Williams et al., 1988) have 
described repetitive negative automatic thinking patterns and perseverative cognition as 
contributing factors to depression symptomology. Cognitive defusion is an empirically supported 
intervention (Mandavia et al., 2015; Masuda et al., 2010) that is used to train participants to 
create psychological distance from their thoughts (Kross, 2001; Masuda et al., 2004) in order to 
facilitate adaptive self-reflection (Mori & Tanno, 2015), interrupt perseverative cognitions and 
reduce distress associated with thoughts (B. J. Deacon et al., 2011; Yovel et al., 2014). The 
present study examined whether a cognitive defusion intervention is able to produce changes 
cognitive and affective processing and emotional experience immediately after thinking about a 
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distressing experience. This study provided preliminary evidence that a brief one session 
cognitive defusion intervention may reduce the experience of negative emotion when thinking 
about difficult situations, may increase the experience of positive emotion, and may alter 
cognitive affective processing. 
Two ERPs thought to index cognitive affective processing were investigated in 
relationship to the course of treatment: P300 and N200. P300 is an event related potential 
thought to index resource allocation for higher-order cognitive operations involved in stimulus 
evaluation and categorization (Donchin & Coles, 1988; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981), and NoGo 
N200 has been reported to be associated with response inhibition, frequently detected during 
Go/NoGo paradigm (Eimer, 1993; Van Boxtel, 2001). Results from a principal components 
analysis indicated that the findings from this study were consistent with prior studies of response 
inhibition using the Go/NoGo task that reported the presence of the N200 ERP component in a 
time window of 250-400 milliseconds post-stimulus and the P300 component in a time window 
between 300 and 600 milliseconds after stimulus onset. In this study, the N200 and P300 
occurred 235-285 milliseconds and 290-475 milliseconds post stimulus, respectively. In this 
study, both N200 and P300 were larger on NoGo trials than Go trials, which suggests that 
inhibiting responses to less frequent NoGo trials requires more attentional resources than 
executing responses for Go stimuli (for a review see Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Polich, 2009).  
Prior studies have reported a reduction of P300 latency from before to after 
antidepressant pharmacotherapy for depression (Işintaş et al., 2012; Karaaslan et al., 2003; Kemp 
et al., 2008). Further, Ogura and colleagues (1993) reported reduced N200 amplitude in 36 
individuals with depression relative to healthy controls that normalized after a course 
pharmacotherapy. EEG changes have also been detected during psychotherapy (Moscovitch et 
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al., 2011). A reduction in P300 latency was detected after cognitive behavioral therapy for 
internet addiction (Ge et al., 2011). The present study used an emotional go-no oddball task 
(Duncan et al., 2009) to elicit an N200 and a P300 response in individuals with dysphoria.  
This study found significant changes in attentional resources allocated to response 
inhibition on no-go trials, as indexed by the N200 ERP, were detected. Due to insignificant 
lower-order contrasts, this finding cannot be significantly parsed apart more separately; however, 
individuals in the defusion condition trended towards requiring less attentional resources to 
inhibit responses (smaller N200) to neutral stimuli during blocks with happy go trials, whereas 
individuals in the sleep hygiene control condition trended towards requiring less attentional 
resources to inhibit responses to neutral stimuli during blocks with angry go trials. This study 
expands on results from Ogura et al. (1993) by indicating the moderating role of stimulus 
valence in measuring N200 in individuals with dysphoria. 
Contrary to the study hypothesis, this exploratory study found no significant changes in 
Emotional Go No Go task performance or P300 characteristics from before to after a brief one 
session cognitive defusion intervention. A significant relationship between baseline P300 
amplitude and the anhedonic depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire was detected; however, it was in the opposite direction than was expected. While 
prior studies have reported attenuated P300 amplitudes in depression (Cavanagh & Geisler, 
2006; Patricia J. Deldin, Deveney, Kim, Casas, & Best, 2001; Deveney & Deldin, 2004; 
Shestyuk et al., 2005), data from this study indicated that higher scores on the anhedonic 
depression subscale of the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire was associated with 
increased P300 amplitude to positively valanced stimuli. Further, in contrast to prior studies that 
reported a positive relationship between prolonged P300 latency and depression severity (Işintaş 
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et al., 2012; Karaaslan et al., 2003; Tripathi et al., 2015), baseline P300 latency was unrelated to 
measures of depression or anxiety symptom severity. 
Limitations 
Several limitations of the present study should be noted. First, the present study recruited 
individuals who scored highly on a measure of depression symptomology (Patient Health 
Questionnaire, score > 10), but did not formally diagnose study participants. Second, half of the 
study participants came from the University of Michigan psychology subject pool and were 
currently enrolled students, which limited the range of depression severity and cognitive 
dysfunction in that sample due to high cognitive demands associated with active enrollment in a 
university setting. Another limitation is the short temporal duration that was provided to 
participants to acquire and practice implementing the cognitive defusion techniques ~(45 min) 
may not have been sufficient to produce meaningful improvements in cognitive affective 
processing, and it is possible that the effect size that cognitive defusion might have on cognitive 
processing, if one exists, may be too small to detect with a participant sample of this size. 
Further, we chose to maximize statistical power by including incorrect NoGo trials within our 
analyses, and although there were no significant differences in NoGo accuracy among any of the 
comparisons we made, it is possible that error related neural responses (Gehring, Goss, Coles, 
Meyer, & Donchin, 1993) on incorrect NoGo trials may have biased our N200 amplitude 
findings. Lastly, the lack of a control sample and baseline equivalence between treatment 
conditions limit these findings; however, by utilizing a mixed-effects design and accounting for 
baseline differences within the model, this study attempted to minimize the effect of baseline 
differences on outcome results. 
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Conclusions 
In sum, the present study demonstrated that a brief cognitive defusion training session 
may reduce emotional discomfort associated with distressing thoughts, may alter socio-
emotional responses to affective stimuli, and may possibly increase positive emotions, perhaps 
related to feelings of agency over distressing thoughts. Further, the present study demonstrated 
the feasibility and positive participant response to a brief psychotherapy intervention in the 
context of an undergraduate psychology subject pool. Future studies may benefit from examining 
the individual components of psychotherapy interventions, such as cognitive defusion, to identify 
tools and techniques for aiding individuals in emotion regulation. 
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Appendix 1: Cognitive Defusion Script 
Now I will tell you of a theory of how our mind can influence our feelings and moods. I will 
show you some ways that you can identify thoughts that your mind may be caught up in, and I 
will also show you some ways that you can get your mind off of the thoughts. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY 
I will now tell you why research suggests that most of human suffering is due to human 
language. As humans, we are great problem solvers. For example, if you get a terrible haircut, 
you can choose to go back to your stylist or you may choose to see a new stylist and get a 
different haircut. Another example is if you don’t like the color you just painted your walls, you 
can choose a new color and repaint them. However, we often wrongfully try to fix bad thoughts 
or feelings by trying to get rid of them in the same way you might fix your wall’s paint color or 
change your haircut. We believe we should be able to control the way we think and feel in the 
same way we can control our hair and wall paint. When we experience thoughts that we don’t 
want to have, we may try to fix or control our thoughts by telling our mind to be quiet or we may 
try to get rid of the thought by thinking about other things. However, this rarely works. Often the 
more we try to control our thoughts, the louder they become. If it is OK with you, I would like to 
do a quick experiment with you.  
 
Please take a second and think of a pink elephant. Try to imagine what 
the pink elephant looks like and what it may be doing. (PAUSE) Now, for the 
next 20 seconds, I would like you to not think about pink elephants. You can 
think of anything else you’d like, but whatever you think about, don’t think 
about pink elephants (Pause for ten seconds). What was that like? (PAUSE) 
Notice that when you try to not think of something such as pink elephants, that 
thought often becomes the thought that is at the forefront of your mind. The 
more you try to control the thought, the harder it becomes to ignore.  
 
When we become absorbed or stuck in our mind's cycle of thoughts, it can contribute to 
depressed mood. In this theory, becoming absorbed by our thoughts is called “thought fusion”. In 
a state of thought fusion, we’re completely focused on the thought: we’re absorbed, fixated on, 
consumed by, or so caught up by the thought that we may not even be aware of the thought. We 
treat thoughts as though they are the literal or absolute truth, a command you have to obey, a 
description that is completely accurate, or a rule you have to follow. We may act as though the 
thought is a threat that you must get rid of as soon as possible, or something that is very 
important and requires all of your attention. 
 
Thought fusion in and of itself is not bad-our mind naturally becomes absorbed by thoughts and 
naturally treats thoughts as reality. There are times when we may want to be fused with our 
thoughts. For example, when reading a novel, I want to be completely engaged and absorbed by 
the story so that I may enjoy reading the novel. 
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Is what I am saying clear? 
 
In the next part, I will describe several types of thought fusion that can contribute to negative 
mood: “thoughts about the past”, “thoughts about the future”, “rules that our mind creates”, and 
“thoughts about the self”. [Hand the overview sheet to participants] 
 
Thoughts about the past or future 
The first type of thought fusion is “thoughts about the past or future”. “Thoughts about the past 
or future” can involve both unpleasant and pleasant thoughts such as fusion with bad memories, 
wishing to recapture positive experiences from the past, getting hooked by fears about the future, 
or wishing for brighter days ahead. These forms of thought fusion pull you out of the present 
moment. 
 
Here is an example of fusion with “thoughts about the past”. Joe was trying to quit smoking, and 
he had not smoked any cigarettes for two months. One day at the supermarket, he bought a pack 
of Marlboros. As he left the market, Joe’s mind had the thought: “The last time I tried to quit 
smoking, I was not able to do it.” His mind also told him “The fact that I bought these cigarettes 
today is proof that I have not been able to quit smoking, and the next time is bound to be the 
same”. In this case, Joe’s mind is fused with the thought “I have not been able to quit smoking”. 
Fusion with the thought “I have not been able to quit smoking” made Joe feel guilty, 
disappointed, worthless, and hopeless about his ability to change. His mind is so stuck on his 
past failings that he does not realize he now has the ability to choose whether to use the 
cigarettes he has just purchased. When your mind is fused with thoughts of the past, it can keep 
you from recognizing the possibilities of the present. 
 
Do you understand what I mean about “thoughts of the past” and how they can influence how 
you feel? 
 
Thoughts about the past or future 
“Thoughts about the future” are similar to “thoughts about the past”. They occur when you 
strongly desire the future to happen in a certain way. For example, Molly has an upcoming job 
interview. Her mind had the thought that it would be “terrible” if something were to go wrong 
and she loses control. She began to think about all the things that could go wrong, which made 
her even more nervous about the interview. In this case, Molly’s mind is fused with the thought 
“this interview will not go well”. Molly’s mind is so absorbed by thoughts about how the future 
could go that her thoughts are making her even more nervous about the upcoming interview. 
When your mind is fused with thoughts about the future, it can increase negative feelings such as 
anxiety, insecurity, and fear in the present, and it can keep you from feeling calm, cool, and 
confident. Fusion with thought about the future may also distract you from the present and keep 
you from thinking clearly. 
 
Do you understand what I mean about “thoughts of the future” and how they can influence how 
you feel? 
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Mental Rules 
Our mind can also become fused with “mental rules”. These rules are used to describe what our 
mind believes is right or wrong or what is good or bad. Rules created by our mind can often be 
identified by the words “should”, “must”, “ought”, “have to”, or “if-then”. For example, while 
Amy was on a diet, she ate two donuts, and afterwards her mind had the thought “I shouldn’t 
have eaten that donut. I should have resisted.” In this case, the rule Amy’s mind is fused with is 
“I must not eat any unhealthy foods”. When Amy broke her mind’s “mental rule”, it made her 
feel disappointed, ashamed, and inadequate. 
 
Fused “Mental rules” may also be applied to others. For example, Fred was waiting for his wife 
to return from work so they could be on time for their dinner reservations. His mind was fused 
with the rule “We cannot be late”. Fred’s wife was late getting home, and his mind had the 
thought “She should be home now. She shouldn’t be late on a day we have plans!” Fred did not 
know why his wife was late from work, and an attitude of blame guaranteed a fight. In this case, 
Fred’s mind was fused with the rule “We cannot be late”, and Fred became frustrated and angry 
when his wife broke his mind’s mental rule even though he did not know her reasons for being 
late. 
 
Fused “mental rules" may increase negative feelings if you feel that you or the other person have 
to follow the rule perfectly. When your mind becomes fused with “rules”, you will tend to make 
yourself feel disappointed if you do not follow your mind’s “rule”, and you may end up feeling 
guilty or frustrated with yourself. When you apply fused “rules” to others, you might feel anger 
or frustration toward the other person if they do not live up to the “rule” and it may make the 
situation worse. Another problem with fused “rules” is that they give certain situations much 
more emotional intensity than they really need.  
 
Do you understand what I mean by fusion with “rules” and how they can influence your feelings 
and moods? 
 
Thoughts about the self 
“Thoughts about the self” occur when you use “I am” statements to describe yourself. These may 
be negative self-descriptions such as “I am stupid”, “I am ugly”, “I am unlovable”, “I am a 
loser”, or “I am a failure”. For example, Curtis was at home alone on a Friday night and his mind 
became absorbed by the thought “I am lonely”. This thought kept playing over and over in his 
mind, and it made him feel sad, isolated, and inferior. Fusion with the thought “I am lonely” 
prevented Curtis from thinking of things he could do to enjoy the evening such as calling a 
friend, watching a show, or going for a walk. In this case, fusion with a “thought about the self” 
fueled his negative mood and prevented Curtis from realizing the possibilities of the present such 
as doing an enjoyable activity. 
 
Summary 
Okay, now I have told you of three kinds of fused thoughts – thoughts about the past or future, 
mental rules, and thoughts about the self – and how they can cause negative feelings. In the 
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examples we discussed, the thoughts themselves are not the problem – these types of thoughts 
are not good or bad. The problem occurs when we become fused, absorbed, focused on, or stuck 
in these thoughts. When you are fused with your thoughts, you may be missing out on what is 
around you because you are not able to engage effectively. I’ll now show you some ways to de-
fuse or un-stick yourself from these thoughts. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO COGNITIVE DEFUSION TECHNIQUES 
One way you can reduce thought fusion is by using thought de-fusion exercises. Defusion means 
separating, detaching, untangling, or distancing ourselves from the thoughts that our mind has. In 
a state of defusion, you can see a thought for what it is: just a thought. In a state of defusion, you 
recognize that a thought may or may not be true; it is definitely not a command you have to obey 
or a rule you have to follow; it is definitely not a threat to you; it is not something happening in 
the real world – it is merely words or pictures inside your head; it may or may not be important. 
You have the choice to pay attention to the thought or not. When we use de-fusion exercises, we 
do not try to control the thoughts just like we could not control the thought of a pink elephant 
earlier. In a state of defusion, your thoughts may pass through your mind without any need for 
you to focus on the thought or to try to push the thought away.  
 
Now we will discuss three ways that you can de-fuse yourself from fused thoughts. The first is 
called “observing the mind”. 
 
Observing the mind 
Thought defusion works by noticing, naming, and neutralizing the fused thought. We want to be 
open and curious about the thoughts that our mind creates. The first way that you can begin to 
practice thought defusion is by observing the mind. Think of your mind as a separate event; 
almost as another person. In this example, there are four people in this room: you, me, your 
mind, and my mind. Can you notice what your mind is thinking right now? What is your mind 
telling you right now? (pause). Now, I would like you to name the thought by saying to yourself 
“I am having the thought that …” or “I notice that I am having the thought that” Congratulations! 
You have just taken the first steps of thought defusion by observing your mind and naming your 
thoughts! 
 
Is what I am saying clear? Please let me know if you have any questions because you’ll be 
applying these techniques to your own thoughts in the next part. 
 
Titchner’s Repetition 
Another way you can create distance from your thoughts and reduce their believability is through 
repetition. Is it ok if I try another exercise with you? This may seem like a funny exercise to be 
doing, but it has helped many people to defuse themselves from stuck thoughts. I would like you 
to think about the word “orange”. What comes to mind? The word “orange” can bring up all 
sorts of associations such as the color orange, the sweet taste, the round shape, the tart smell, or 
the rubbery feel. Notice that the sensations that the word orange brings up makes it seem almost 
as if there is an orange in this room right now. As far as I know, there isn’t an orange in the 
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room. In a few seconds, I would like you to repeat the word orange over and over with me. Are 
you ready? “orange, orange, orange…” What did you notice as we did this exercise? Notice, as 
you repeat the word over and over again, the word begins to lose its original meaning and you 
begin to notice other things like its sound characteristics. Your mind may have the thought that 
“orange” is a funny sounding word.  
 
In practice, the first step of using this thought defusion technique is to identify the thought that is 
particularly disturbing. For example, the thought may be “I am stupid”. After identifying the 
thought, restate the thought into a single meaningful word such as “stupid”. Then repeat that 
word over and over again until it begins to lose its meaning. This often takes around 45 seconds 
of repeating. 
 
Does this strategy make sense? Any questions? 
 
Altering the context of thoughts 
A third way you can create distance from your thoughts is to “sing out your thoughts” or to think 
of your thoughts in silly voices. You might sing your thoughts to the tune of a song such as 
“happy birthday to you” or “Mary had a little lamb”. Or, you might say your thoughts in a silly 
voice such as the voice of Donald Duck. For example, if your mind was fused to the thought “I 
am so stupid”, you might sing that the thought to the tune of “happy birthday to you.” 
(Experimenter provides a demonstration). I know these exercises may seem unusual, but research 
has shown that changing the voice or tune of the fused thought allows your mind to become 
disentangled from the literal, verbal meaning of the thoughts. 
 
Do you have any questions about this or any of the other two thought defusion exercises? 
 
Summary 
Okay, we’ve seen that negative moods can be created from thought fusion. 
I’ve shown you three common types of fused thoughts and three thought de-fusion exercises that 
can be used to create distance between you and your thoughts. 
Would you review them with me? (provide participants with review sheet) 
 





Identifying and De-fusing Fused Thoughts 
 
Thought fusion: becoming fixated on or absorbed by a thought; treating thoughts as the literal or 
absolute truth 
De-fusion: seeing a thought for what it is: nothing more or less than a bunch of words or pictures 
in your head 
 
 
3 types of fused thoughts: 
 
Thoughts about the future or the past 
How to identify: Fusion with the past or future can involve both unpleasant and pleasant 
thoughts: fusion with bad memories, wishing to recapture positive experiences from the past, 
getting hooked by fears about the future, or wishing for brighter days ahead. These forms of 
thought fusion pull you out of the present moment. 
 
Rules 
How to identify: Fusion with rules occurs when your mind creates rules that describe things as 
right or wrong or good or bad. Rule-governed thinking often consists of the words “should”, 
“must”, “ought”, “have to”, or “if-then”. 
 
Thoughts about the self 
How to identify: Thoughts about the self are the stories we tell or labels we use that make up our 
sense of identity. They typically begin with “I am”.  
 
3 ways to de-fuse fused thoughts: 
 
Observing the mind 
Treat “the mind” as an external event; almost as a separate person. Describe your thoughts using 




Identify the fused thought (e.g. “I am stupid”). Restate the thought into a single meaningful word 
(e.g. “stupid”). Then repeat the word for approximately 45 seconds until it begins to loose its 
meaning. 
 
Altering the voice 
Sing your thoughts using tunes such as “happy birthday to you” or “Mary had a little lamb”. 






Appendix 2: Sleep Hygiene Script 
INTRODUCTION TO SLEEP HYGEINE 
 
Now I will tell you a theory of how the amount and quality of our sleep can influence our 
feelings and moods. I will show you some ways that you can improve your sleep. 
You are probably aware that sleep can affect your mood. After a sleepless night, you may 
feel grumpy, irritable, or stressed. Once you are able to get a good night's sleep, your mood often 
improves. Studies have shown that even partial sleep deprivation has a large effect on our mood. 
Lack of sleep increases anxiety, stress, and agitation. Stress affects sleep by making the body 
aroused and alert, which makes it difficult to fall asleep. 
Many people struggle with not getting enough sleep. While many people believe they can 
function well on less than seven hours of sleep, this is usually not the case. Remember that these 
recommendations are based on averages - so you personally may need more or less sleep than 
average.  
Sleep problems can lead to more significant psychological problems, such as depression. 
In one study, people with insomnia were 5 times more likely to develop depression and 20 times 
more likely to develop an anxiety disorder. For some people, sleep difficulties are a result of 
mental health concerns such as depression, anxiety, or sleep disorders. For others, sleep 
difficulties develop from poor sleep behaviors (i.e., sleep hygiene). Others have lifestyles that 
interfere with their ability to get an adequate amount of sleep. In both of these cases, poor sleep 
can contribute to mental health concerns such as depression or anxiety.  
The first step towards improving your sleep is assessing your sleep habits to see if there 
are steps you can take to improve your sleep quality. Today, I will give you some general tips 
and techniques to improve your sleep quality. Even if you do not have sleep problems, taking 
steps to ensure you are getting adequate sleep will lead to improved mood and well-being. 





Our brain has an internal clock that determines what time of day it is and what should be 
happening. This 24-hour process is known as our circadian rhythm. This “clock” is a very smart 
clock. It’s aware of changes in our environment such as traveling across the country or 
differences in the amount of daylight between summer and winter days. However, the same 
things that help the brain’s clock adapt to new situations can also lead it to become out of sync.  
We can learn a lot about how to regulate our sleep and activity from cavemen. Think 
back to their time - before the Internet, the telephone and light bulbs. Cavemen used the rise and 
fall of the sun and moon to determine what time of day it was and what they should be doing. 
Nowadays, we’re able to turn on and off our version of the sun whenever we’d like by using 
light bulbs. The light from light-bulbs influences our circadian rhythm in the same way the sun 
does. In the morning, the rise of the sun was the caveman’s signal that the day was beginning. 
Like the cavemen, in your mornings, strive for bright light (sunlight if possible) upon awakening. 
The most important thing you can do to set your circadian rhythm and improve sleep is to 
wake up at the same time each day--even on the weekends.  
For the cavemen, during the day, an abundance of sunlight was a sign that it was time to 
explore and adventure out to collect food. During your daytime, eat at about the same times 
every day and engage in activities that get the body moving to simulate exploration and 
physical activity.  
In the evening, the sunset was a sign that it is time to return home and relax before bed.  
In your evenings, make the last hour before bed a wind-down period. Engage in 
relaxing activities and dim the lights to signal bedtime (no brighter than a campfire). Avoid 
using computers, cellphones, or large televisions prior to bed - the brain confuses this light with 
sunlight. Make sure your bedroom is dark, quiet, and cool (around 65 degrees).  
Research suggests that the deep sleep stage is the most important for refreshing our body 
and mind. It’s critical for reducing fatigue and improving our mood. However, just because 
we’re asleep during the night, doesn’t mean we’re getting enough deep sleep. In fact, it’s 
possible to sleep all night and not get deep sleep. Common barriers to deep sleep include 
substance use, sounds in our environment, and difficulties breathing. The following tips may 





Research shows that keeping a consistent wake time (along with morning bright light 
exposure) is the most important cue for setting your circadian rhythm.  
 
SLEEP HYGEINE 
Now I would like to turn towards an overview of what we call sleep hygiene. Sleep hygiene are 
habits that lead towards improved sleep quality and possibly improved mood. 
1) Don’t consume caffeinated products (e.g., coffee, tea, many sodas, chocolate) in 
the evening. Caffeine makes it difficult to fall asleep and disrupts your sleep during 
the night. Try to eliminate caffeine within eight hours of bedtime.  
2) Don’t use alcohol to help you sleep or consume alcohol too close to bedtime. 
Although alcohol may help you to fall asleep more easily, it disrupts your sleep 
during the night by causing frequent awakenings. Try to eliminate alcohol within 
three hours of bedtime. Smoking and other drugs also disrupt your sleep. If you 
smoke, don’t smoke too close to bedtime and don’t smoke if you awaken.  
3) Allow your body to process food and drinks before bed. Try not to eat a big meal 
within three hours of bedtime. Restrict liquids in the evening (less than 8-10 oz) and 
use the toilet right before bed. If necessary, have a light carbohydrate snack (e.g., 
crackers, bread, cereal) during the last hour before bed to prevent nighttime hunger.  
Do these tips make sense? Any questions? 
1) Create a calm, quiet and comfortable sleeping environment. If you live in a noisy 
area, creating a constant background noise in the sleep environment using a white- 
noise machine, fan, or humidifier will eliminate unexpected sounds that would 
otherwise wake you up. Other tips: use a dark room/eye mask, don’t use a 
TV/electronics, remove your clock, sleep at a cool temperature (i.e., 60-65 degrees), 
use earplugs, and use comfortable bedding and pajamas.  
2) Exercise regularly, but do not engage in activities that raise body temperature 
(e.g., warm bath) too close to bedtime. Regular exercise can improve sleep quality, 
but exercising or having a warm bath too close to bedtime can disrupt sleep onset. 





3) Keep regular daily activity and sleep schedule. Wake and sleep around the same 
time each day (plus or minus a half hour--even on weekends).  
Do these tips make sense? Any questions? 
1) Make the last hour before bed a “wind-down” time. Engage in relaxing and pleasant 
activities, dim the lights, and/or have a light snack.  
2) Strive for bright light in the morning on awakening but limit exposure to bright 
light in the evening.  
3) Snoring can be a sign of sleep apnea. If you regularly snore, there is a good chance you 
have sleep apnea. Sleep apnea is a common sleep disorder that occurs when you have 
difficulty breathing while sleeping. Difficulties breathing can prevent your brain from 
going into deeper stages of sleep to protect you from suffocating.  
Do you have any questions about these or any of the other sleep hygiene tips? 
 
SUMMARY 
Okay, now I have discussed how our sleep is related to our mood. I’ve shown you some ways to 
improve your sleep hygiene. Let’s briefly review them. 
1. Keep a regular daily activity and sleep schedule. 
2. Eat regular meals every day. 
3. Make the last hour before bed a “wind-down” time. 
4. Do not consume more than 8-10 oz of liquids in the evening. 
5. Do not consume caffeinated products in the evening. 
6. Do not use alcohol to help you sleep or too close to bedtime. 
7. Smoking and other drugs will disrupt your sleep. 
8. Do not nap during the day. 
9. Exercise regularly, but do not engage in activities that raise body temperature (e.g. warm 
bath) too close to bedtime. 











Sleep Hygiene Recommendations 
1. Keep a regular daily activity and sleep schedule. Keeping a regular bedtime and rise time 
every night, including weekends, stabilizes the biological clock. Regular daily activity keeps 
the biological clock timed to daylight hours. 
2. Eat regular meals every day. Regular meals are signals to the biological clock about time of 
day. Do not eat a big meal within about three hours of bedtime. Have a light carbohydrate 
snack (e.g., crackers, bread, cereal) during the last hour before bed to signal bedtime and 
prevent nighttime hunger. 
3. Make the last hour before bed a "wind-down" time. Engage in relaxing and pleasant 
activities, dim the lights, and have a light snack. 
4. Do not consume more than 8-10 oz of liquids in the evening. A or semi-full bladder can 
contribute to awakenings. Restrict liquids in the evening after dinner and void right before 
bed. 
5. Do not consume caffeinated products (e.g., coffee, tea, many sodas, chocolate) in the 
evening. Caffeine makes it difficult to fall asleep and disrupts your sleep during the night. 
Eliminate caffeine within 8 hours of bedtime. 
6. Do not use alcohol to help you sleep or consume alcohol too close to bedtime. Although 
alcohol may help you to fall asleep more easily, it disrupts your sleep during the night by 
causing frequent awakenings. One drink of alcohol should not be consumed within 3 hours of 
bedtime. 
7. Smoking and other drugs will disrupt your sleep. If you smoke, do not smoke too close to 
bedtime and do not smoke during the night if you are awake. All drugs of abuse worsen your 
sleep. 
8. Do not nap during the day. Napping makes it harder to fall asleep and stay asleep at night. 
9. Exercise regularly, but do not engage in activities that raise body temperature (e.g., warm 
bath) too close to bedtime. Regular exercise can improve sleep quality, but exercising or 
having a warm bath too close to bedtime can disrupt sleep onset. The best time to exercise to 
help sleep is in the late afternoon or early evening. Warm baths can be taken in the evening, 
but not within 1.5 hours of going to bed. 
10. Create a sleep-friendly bedroom environment. Make sure that your bed is comfortable and 
that your bedroom is dark, quiet, and cool (around 65 0 F). Darkness signals to the biological 
clock that it is night time. Creating constant background noise in the sleep environment (e.g., 
a fan, humidifier) will eliminate unexpected sounds that would otherwise wake you up. 







Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Dissertation Aim 
Current antidepressant response rates are unacceptably low, hovering around 50-70% 
(Fava & Davidson, 1996). Worse, full remission rates are estimated at only 35-45% (Thase, 
Entsuah, & Rudolph, 2001), with some estimates as low as 11 percent - even after 8–12 months 
of treatment (Cipriani et al., 2009). This dissertation aimed to produce research that may inform 
personalized approaches toward depression care in order to improve response rates.  
Study 1 
The first study collected data from the National Institutes of Mental Health Establishing 
Moderators and Biosignatures of Antidepressant Response for Clinical Care (EMBARC) and 
provided evidence to suggest that the Sociotropy-Autonomy scale is a robust moderator of 
antidepressant treatment response. In fact, this scale was able to accurately classify nearly 80% 
of participants into categories of antidepressant treatment responders and non-responders. 
Seventy-five percent of socio responders had a score below 85, while 75% of socio non-
responders had a score above 85. Based on this criterion, out of 24 participants, only 3 non-
responders were incorrectly categorized and 2 responders were incorrectly categorized. The 
classification strength of the sociotropy subscale of this measure by itself was unexpected, and 





interpretations here are speculative. Individuals high in sociotropy tend to be more dependent on 
others and are more likely to experience significant interpersonal events that are theorized to 
trigger a depressive episode (Connor-Smith, 2002; Hammen, 1989; Hammen, 1992). It is 
possible that if interpersonal stress is the proximal cause of a depressive episode, medication 
may be unable to address the interpersonal stress, but, rather, a reduction in interpersonal stress 
may require a shift in interpersonal relationships that the individual with high sociotropy has to 
those around them. Accordingly, a recent study demonstrated that among a sample of 380 high 
school freshman, students high in sociotropy are more likely to experience reductions in 
depressive symptoms during interpersonally focused group psychotherapy than those who 
received group cognitive behavioral therapy (Horowitz, 2007). A future study could test this 
theory by randomizing individuals with depression to either receive medication or receive 
interpersonal therapy (IPT) and examine the relationship of baseline sociotropy to outcomes. 
Taken together, if data from this study are replicated, the Sociotropy-Autonomy scale provides a 
reliable, cheap and simple way to predict whether medication is a good treatment strategy for an 
individual who is experiencing major depression. 
Study 2 
Study 2, which focused on the relationship of reward processing to the placebo response, 
provides novel data linking anhedonia to placebo non-response. Based on prior literature, it was 
hypothesized that individuals with attenuated mesolimbic reward system activity would be less 
likely to respond to a placebo. This study’s theory was based on prior research that proposed the 
placebo response is facilitated via reward processing in the mesolimbic reward system 





this theory, we used two measures that are thought to index mesolimbic reward system activation 
from various units of analysis including a behavioral paradigm (Pizzagalli, 2008) and 
physiological data (Wacker, 2009), along with an indirect self-report measure of anhedonia that 
may indicate dysfunctional mesolimbic reward system processing (MASQ-AD; Keller, 2013), 
Prior to investigating the relationship of mesolimbic reward system activity to the 
placebo response, it was important to determine the convergent validity of the various 
hypothesized indices of mesolimbic reward system activity. However, contrary to our 
hypothesis, the indices of mesolimbic reward system activation proposed by prior research did 
not demonstrate significant relationships among each other. The tested behavioral index (reward 
learning on a probabilistic reward task) was unrelated to the tested physiological index (rACC 
delta EEG). Further, the indirect self-report index of mesolimbic reward system dysfunction 
(MASQ-AD) was unrelated to the tested physiological index (rACC delta EEG) or behavioral 
index (reward learning on a probabilistic reward task). The lack of convergent validity among 
these measures signals the need for further investigation into the independent relationships of 
each of these measures to reward system activity. 
Based on results from Wacker, Dillon, and Pizzagalli (2009), who reported a strong 
association between rACC delta EEG activity and the MASQ-AD (r=.54), we expected a similar 
strength of relationship; however, the strength of association between rACC delta EEG and 
MASQ-AD in this dataset was r=.01. It is possible that the prior pattern of results depends on the 
population they were acquired form. While the data from the present study was acquired from a 
sample of individuals diagnosed with MDD, the data from Wacker (2009) came from a sample 





differences in preprocessing steps used when analyzing the EEG data; however, it is unlikely as 
the EEG data from this study was preprocessed by the same research team that preprocessed the 
EEG data from the prior publication. Nonetheless, differences in noise introduced during the 
recording of the EEG data (e.g. EMG artifacts, environmental noise) may also account for some 
of the differences in findings.  
The lack of an association between the self-report measure of anhedonia (MASQ-AD) 
and the behavioral index of mesolimbic reward system processing (reward learning on the 
probabilistic reward task) is not necessarily a new finding. Data from Pizzagalli et al. (2008) was 
unable to detect a relationship between reward learning on the probabilistic reward task and the 
MASQ-AD. However, Pizzagalli (2008) did report a significant relationship between the 
MASQ-AD and “rich misses” on the probabilistic reward task. Unfortunately, that subset of the 
data was unavailable for further analysis, and, through personal communication with Dr. 
Pizzagalli, it was suggested that the lack of an effect from the more general reward learning 
index indicates to him that it may not be useful to analyze lower level effects. Taken together, it 
is unclear whether reward learning on the probabilistic reward task and the MASQ Anhedonic 
Depression subscale are measuring the same construct. 
In sum, the two hypothesized indices of reward learning included in this study do not 
appear to be measuring the same construct, and they were unrelated to anhedonia. More broadly, 
it is possible that these measures index distinct non-overlapping facets of the reward system. 
Future research may benefit from a better understanding of the how these measures are each 
independently related to the mesolimbic reward system. For example, it may be that neural 





may be confounded by non-reward neural activation such as self-referential processing (Wagner, 
2012). Further, a limitation of EEG data is that it is unable to provide completely accurate source 
localization of the signals even with advanced source localization techniques, such as those 
employed in the present study; therefore, it possible that neural activation from non-reward 
regions of the brain may be confounding these findings. Or, it may be that while the construct of 
anhedonia is believed to indicate attenuated reward system processing, in samples of individuals 
with depression the MASQ-AD may also be capturing depression symptomology unrelated to 
reward system processing. Lastly, it may be useful to study how the associations among these 
various measures strengthen or weaken depending on the population they are tested in. With 
stronger theory and the ability to isolate extraneous sources of noise that may be influencing the 
present findings, it is possible that the relationship of reward system activity to the placebo 
response may become clearer. 
As mentioned above, the lack of intercorrelation among the hypothesized indices of 
reward system processing is contrary to the theory that led to this study’s hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC) EEG activity was significantly related to 
the placebo response - just in the opposite direction than was hypothesized. Post-hoc analyses 
were conducted aimed at better understanding the reasons why the data might exhibit this 
pattern, and were initiated based on theories from the antidepressant treatment response literature 
(e.g. Arns, 2015). It was revealed that rACC theta EEG provided superior predictive ability 
relative to rACC delta. Although the link between higher baseline rACC theta activity and 
antidepressant non-response has been well-established in meta-analytical studies (Pizagalli, 





2018). It is possible that elevated rACC theta activity is characteristic of a subtype of depression 
that is particularly amenable to pharmacotherapy and the placebo effect. Marchetti (2012) 
reviewed a body of literature exploring the relationship of default mode network dysfunction to a 
potential type of recurrent depression. Given the central role of the rACC in the default mode 
network, it is possible that rACC theta activity is associated with a type of recurrent depression 
that exhibits dysfunction within this region. 
Taken together, this study adds to prior reports linking rACC theta EEG to the depression 
treatment response (Arns et al., 2015), and, consistent with prior theories (e.g. Schweinhardt, 
Seminowicz, Jaeger, Duncan, & Bushnell, 2009; Wacker, Dillon, & Pizzagalli, 2009), this study 
provides novel data linking anhedonia to placebo non-response in individuals with depression. 
Study 3 
The third study targeted negative self-referential processing (Mennin & Fresco, 2013) in 
individuals with dysphoria using a cognitive defusion intervention (Mandavia et al., 2015; 
Masuda et al., 2010) and results indicated that a brief single-session cognitive defusion 
intervention, which was well-received by students, produced significant decreases in negative 
emotions and significant increases in positive emotions associated with a difficult life situation. 
The data from this study was unable to provide evidence to suggest that cognitive defusion 
techniques could alter the cognitive processes indexed by the P300 event related potential (ERP). 
While this study did provide evidence of changes in cognitive processes indexed by NoGo N200 
amplitude, these results were not interpretable using the current body of literature on N200 or 
cognitive and affective processes in depression. In short, these data suggest that a brief one-





emotions, and may lead to unspecified shifts in cognitive and affective processing indexed by 
NoGo-N200 ERP amplitude. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the studies included in this dissertation provide new directions for research that 
aims to improve treatment outcomes. If replicated, studies 1 and 2 provide the possibility for 
swift translation into routine clinical care through the identification of the Sociotropy-Autonomy 
Scale and the MASQ Anhedonic Depression subscale as possible predictors of treatment 
outcomes. Studies that examine the relationship of the Sociotropy-Autonomy scale to various 
forms of treatment, such comparing Interpersonal Psychotherapy (IPT) to antidepressant 
pharmacotherapy, may provide insight into not only who doesn’t respond to antidepressants, but 
also whom will benefit from psychotherapy instead. Further, studies that examine the 
relationship of higher pre-treatment MASQ anhedonic depression symptoms to different forms 
of treatment may also show benefit. As Behavioral Activation psychotherapy is designed to 
reduce symptoms of anhedonia by increasing contact with pleasurable stimuli (Dimidjian, 2011), 
Behavioral Activation may be a useful alternative for individuals higher baseline MASQ 
anhedonic depression symptoms. 
While study 2 also provided further evidence of the utility of pre-treatment rACC theta 
for predicting treatment outcomes, the utility of EEG in routine clinical care is still a distant 
possibility as EEG methodologies involve substantial financial, personnel, and time requirements 
for adequate implementation. However, computing costs are decreasing, and biofeedback 
devices that measure EEG activity outside of the laboratory environment are becoming more 





Rodriguez-Villegas, 2010). This raises the possibility for EEG findings such as these to be more 
feasibly translated into routine clinical care. On the other side of the coin, for individuals who do 
have higher pre-treatment rACC theta activity, it is possible that referral to a sleep clinic for an 
assessment for possible sleep disorders such as obstructive sleep apnea or insomnia may lead to 
positive outcomes as well, as treatment for obstructive sleep apnea (Schroder & O’Hara, 2005; 
Manber, 2014) and insomnia have been shown to reduce depression symptoms independently of 
depression focused treatment.  
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